A Comparative Study On Equity Incentive Effect Of Listed Companies With Different Property Rights

The principal-agent problem is a common problem in modern enterprises with two-power separation characteristics.Establishing a mechanism to reduce agency costs and then solve agency problems has become an important task for all companies.The birth of equity incentive system is to effectively alleviate the agency problem,reduce the conflict of interests between the managers and the managers,and then improve the business performance.The development of equity incentive system in western countries is relatively mature,and its incentive effect is also significant.China's equity incentives have been introduced since the 1990 s and have experienced slow and turbulent development for a relatively long period of time.Since 2005,the issuance of various relevant regulations and laws by relevant state agencies has promoted the rapid development of equity incentive systems in China's enterprises.Then the effect of equity incentives in Chinese companies can be as significant as in Western companies?Based on the specific national conditions in our country,what are the differences in the level of equity incentives among listed companies with different property rights? How does this impact on corporate performance?The company ' s stock incentives and corporate performance data are empirically tested,and the differences in the effect of equity incentives among listed companies with different property rights in China are analyzed and compared.Firstly,on the basis of reviewing the research results of equity incentives both at home and abroad,the article analyzes the development history and current status of equity incentives in China,and discusses property rights theory,equity incentive theory,and EVA related theories and proposes corresponding assumptions.Secondly,China's A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2016 were selected as research samples and statistical analysis,regression analysis and other methods were used for testing.Finally,grouping the sample data for regression yields the following conclusions:(1)The listed company that implements the equity incentive plan will have better corporate performance than the listed company that has never implemented the equity incentive plan,and this phenomenon is more evident in state-owned enterprises;(2)The listed company implements equity incentives The performance is significantly improved compared to the implementation of equity incentives,and this performance improvement effect is more pronounced in state-ownedenterprises;(3)In the enterprises that implement equity incentives,the level of equity incentives is positively related to firm performance,and there is no significant difference between this kind of positive correlation between corporate equity incentive levels and firm performance.Based on the foregoing research conclusions,this paper believes that the equity incentive system should be promoted in Chinese enterprises to improve corporate performance.At the same time,relevant recommendations were put forward from both corporate and government levels.Company-level recommendations include: Targeting state-owned enterprises,We should enhance the awareness of equity incentives,actively implement equity incentives,clarify property rights systems,improve governance structures,and establish a sound professional manager market.For private enterprises,scientific and reasonable equity should be designed.Incentive plan to build a scientific performance evaluation system;government-level recommendations include: reduce administrative intervention in the capital market,improve the effectiveness of the capital market,and improve the relevant system laws and regulations.