Coordination Strategy Of Cloud Computing Service Supply Chain

With the technology development of cloud computing and the maturing of its business model,increasing traditional IT enterprises,operators and Internet companies have transformed to be cloud computing service providers.The division of labor in IT service business is getting clearer,which brings the advantage of profession and scale effects,but also leads to stronger dependence between each other,followed by risk and uncertainty.Therefore,how to effectively coordinate the interests between the member enterprises is particularly important.This paper mainly use the techonology of contracts and game theory to coordinate the cloud computing service supply chain(CCSSC),consisting of platform providers and application providers,under different circumstances.The market between this CCSSC and users is modeled as an M/M/1 queuing system,taking into account user's delay cost;The market equilibrium condition is that user's marginal revenue is equal to its marginal cost;cloud platform providers have a non-linear cost structure.The main research contents and results of this paper are listed as follows:(1)A coordination strategy of CCSSC is put forward when the market information is asymmetric,the core of which is cloud platform providers changing his linear charge mode into a nonlinear charge mode.Numerical analysis is used to demonstrate the tendency of cloud application providers to exaggerate users' delay cost for a larger profit.Then it is proved that the revenue sharing contract is invalid in this case.Finally,it is found that the key to coordination is cloud platform providers adopting a nonlinear charge mode,which corresponds with his cost structure.(2)In order to explore whether the compensation mechanism between cloud platform providers,cloud application providers and users is necessary to coordinate a CCSSC with service interruption,a compensation contract is added to the basic model and the concept of service level is introduced.The analyses prove that the compensation mechanism is not a necessary condition to achieve the coordination of this CCSSC.The necessary and sufficient condition for the realization of coordination is still that cloud platform providers changing his linear charge mode into nonlinear charge mode,which corresponds with his cost structure.(3)In order to explore the influence of service level,network effect and incomplete information on the coordination of CCSSC composed of a number of cloud platform providers and cloud application providers,cloud platform provider's service level is refined into a variable affected by his technical level and effort level.It is proved that with complete information,the cost and revenue sharing contract can coordinate the CCSSC.Then the"principal-agent model" is used to do further analysis of the adverse selection problem faced by the cloud application providers when technology level is cloud platform provider's private information.It is found that global optimization and separating equilibrium cannot be achieved at the same time using the above cost and revenue sharing contract,but can be achieved separately.Also,the conditions of contract parameters aming at global optimization and separating equilibrium are given separately.