Supplychain Problem Research Based On Incomplete Information Game Theory

In recently,research method on supplychain by game theory has aroused great concern in academia and been used widely.There are three main approaches to the traditional research on supplychain.Firstly,Control Theory.This is a supplychain model with differential equations.People study its properties by the integral transformation.The advantage is that you can dynamically analyze the supplychain and the disadvantage is that the supplychain system is required to be linear.And the actual situation of the supplychain can not meet this condition,so its use is limited greatly;Secondly,the simulation method.It is a model for the supplychain system;Thirdly,Operational Research method.It mainly applies nonlinear supplychain system,but this approach does not rigorously analyze the supplychain.Previous research on supplychain has focused only on the specific node enterprises of the system.There are few coordination problems for the overall chain as a whole.Even if it is limited to unilateral incomplete information.Further research on supplychain system node enterprises with private information is lacking.Especially using the supplychain contract coordinates the various nodes in the system.The profit of both the supplier who owns the product's production cost and the seller who has the real market demand information is a situation,in which you increase in the production costs and changes in market demand.The sales reward and punishment contract has the flexibility to balance the information superiority supplier and seller.Firstly,this note studies the choice problem of suppliers from the perspective of sending signals in the case of unilateral incomplete information.It designs a game model that the suppliers of different types to send signal cost is different.Though themathematical method,the only refining Bayesian equilibrium is obtained.The conclusion is that manufacturer can receive signals from suppliers,when suppliers of different types signaling cost are not same.Which solves the problem of supplier selection game in the case of unilateral incomplete information.Secondly,it studies the issue that formulates the supplychain contract,which the two-level supplychain of supplier with the private information on the production cost of the product and the seller with the market real demand information in this bilateral non-complete information case.This note introduces the altruistic client without personal profit as the client of the system.The supplychain is the coordinator,a two-level supplychain game model is established for supplier and seller in such a bilateral non-complete information case.First of all,the optimal order quantity of the complete information is compared with the optimal order quantity of the bilateral incomplete information.The study finds that the profit of the supplychain has been distorted.The two-level supplychain is difficult to coordinate in this bilateral non-complete information case.Then it gets the transfer payments of the node enterprise in the system.Finally,the note studies the fixed price contract problem and solves the specific parameter form of the sales reward and punishment contract.This note provides a theoretical basis and practical method for the research of specific nodes in the supplychain system and the formulation of other types of supplychain system contracts.