The Study Of Supply Chain Incentive Mechanism Base On Asymmetric Information

With the mankind entered the 21st century, the market competition is becoming increasingly fierce and the competition among enterprises gradually turns to be the evolution which happens among the enterprise supply chains. Therefore, how to improve the supply chain management levels, improve the management and operation of enterprises under the guidance of the management theory of supply chain, became the problem that community and academia increasingly are concerned about. The core of supply chain management is how to design a mechanism or contract, which makes each enterprise of supply chain achieve its maximum benefits, at the same time makes the supply chain coordinate, as a result, makes the enterprise get the aim of entire maximum benefits, cost reduction, inventory cost reduction, goods flow faster, shortening the cycle and logistics optimal quality. In order to achieve these goals is not a simple matter. This paper first analyses the problem of optimal risk-sharing and optimal effort level between the suppliers and sellers who are under the asymmetric information.Through the research, we can find that this situation is Pareto-optimality. And then, this paper under the asymmetric information designs the optimal incentive mechanism which suppliers provides to sellers under demand uncertainty through the use of the principal-agent theory and the help of mathematical models and compares the designs of incentive mechanisms of same risk preference to the designs of incentive mechanism of different risk preference between suppliers and sellers. So we can get the result that is how suppliers provide incentive mechanisms to sellers of different risk preference. Finally, We focus on the problems which occur in the supply chain application of agency , design a number of solutions, and hope that these plans can have some use for the reality of supply chain.