Empirical Research On Influence Of Executive Contorl Power To On-the-job Consumption And Corporate Performance

The domestic and foreign scholars' research on the influence of executives' on-the-job consumption on the performance of listed companies is divided into two perspectives,the efficiency view and agency view,and whether these two views are contradictory or not? Is it possible to reconcile their contradictions and integrate them? At the same time,the executive power of excessive expansion behavior has caused the attention of scholars,executives use their power to influence the compensation level to grab the on-the-job consumption,is it affects corporate performance? These questions make it very meaningful to explore the influence of on-the-job consumption on enterprise performance from the perspective of executive control power.The paper defines the concept and measurement of on-the-job consumption,enterprise performance and executive control power.The paper based on the input-output efficiency theory,principal-agent theory and executive power theory to analyze the theoretical basis of the paper.And selects the A-shares listed enterprises from Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010-2013 as the initial study sample,using multiple regression models to estimate the normal consumption and excess consumption.And carry out the principal component analysis of the 7 indicators of executive control power;obtain the comprehensive index of executive control power.By constructing multiple regressions equation,the study found: The normal on-the-job consumption of listed companies' executives has positive incentive effect on corporate performance,and the excessive on-the-job consumption has negative incentive effect.It shows that the "efficiency view" and "agency view" are coordinated and unified,and the key lies in the assurance of "degree".With the increase of executive power,the negative incentive effect of excessive on-the-job consumption is more significant.After distinguishing the nature of different final controllers,it is found that the negative incentive effect of excessive on-the-job consumption of state-owned listed companies is higher than that of non-state-owned listed companies.Moreover,under the influence of executive power,the negative incentive effect of state-owned listed companies is higher than that of non-state-owned listed companies.Based on the empirical results and the cause analysis,the paper put forward some applicable recommendations from four aspects on how to curb the excessive consumption of executives in listed companies.