Family Business's Excess Control Right,CEO Sources And Equity Incentive

In 2005,the CSRC drafted the Opinions on the Norms of Equity Incentives for Listed Companies,marking the formal and law-based basis for the equity incentive of listed companies in our country,which means the development of the equity incentive system in China reaching a new stage.On July 13,2016,the CSRC formally released the Measures for the Administration of Equity Incentives for Listed Companies,which was carried out the next month.Evidently,it further pushed the development of equity incentive to a new level.With the continuous deepening of equity incentive system,many a listed companies has many problems in the process of implementing equity incentive and becomes the debating focus of society.The design of equity incentive and its efficiency also drew the attention of many scholars.besides,from the perspective of the family's emotional wealth,for family businesses — a significant group of enterprises in the capital market,whether the ultimate excess control of the family by the family businesses will affect their equity incentive behaviors? And what are the impacts of the employment of the professional managers in the family businesses.These are undoubtedly important issues for present equity incentive researches.In this paper,from the perspective of the excess control of family businesses,taking the A-share family listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2014 to 2016 as the research sample,this paper focuses on the relationship between excessively controlling and equity incentive behaviors in listed family businesses,and further explores the influence of different sources of CEO on the relation and mechanism of excess control right over equity incentives.Through multiple regression tests on variables,the following conclusions are drawn from empirical analysis:(1)Excessive control of family businesses will affect the choice of equity incentive and there is a significant negative correlation between excess control right and preference of equity incentive;(2)For the family businesses that implemented the equity incentive,the excess control right will also affect the design of the equity incentive plan,and the greater the excess control right,the longer the validity of the equity incentive;(3)When the CEO source of the family business is external professional managers,the inhibition of excess control right on the preference of equity incentive will be weakened,meanwhile,for the family businesses that have equity incentive,the promotion effect of excess control right on the validity of equity incentive will also be weakened.Based on the separation of ownership,this paper,from the perspective of family business,investigates the impact of the excess control right of listed family businesses on the preference and scheme design of equity motivation.Combining the aspect of human resources,this paper further explores the adjusting impact of CEO's source,which attaches this paper with a certain innovation.The conclusions of this paper not only enrich the relevant researches concerning family business,excess control as wellas equity incentive,but also have significant practical value for the implementation of equity incentive in family businesses.