Research On The Impact And Paths Of Vertical Interlocks Of Executives On Enterprise Value

As one of the ways to strengthen the control of listed companies,vertical interlocks of executives is widespread in the capital market.According to principal agent theory,vertical interlocks of executives can alleviate information asymmetry and optimize the decision-making process and executive efficiency of enterprises.However,in fact,especially in the transitional economies,this institutional arrangement has often become a means for large shareholders to seek private benefits.The academic research on the vertical interlocks of executives is rare,and the conclusions are not consistent.From the perspective of enterprise value,this paper probes into the causes of vertical interlocks of executives and its influence on enterprise value,and further studies the influence ways.This paper is divided into six parts.The first chapter is an introduction,which mainly introduces the background and significance of the vertical division of senior executives,combing the research ideas and the framework of the article,and illustrates the innovation points.The second chapter is the definition of the concept and literature review,collection and analysis of existing research literature,and summarized.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis,based on the previous literature and related theory,analysis and put forward the research hypothesis.The fourth,fifth,sixth chapter is the main part of this empirical research.It introduces the data source,sample selection,variable definition and model construction,gives and analyzes the empirical test results.The empirical research mainly focuses on three aspects:(1)what is the impact of vertical interlocks of executives concurrently on the enterprise value;(2)how do vertical interlocks of executives influence the enterprise value;(3)what factors will change as the degree of influence on enterprise value.Since the listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange have little information about the salary of the executives,this paper selects the listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange as samples,and collects a total of 3801 sets of sample data for 2013-2015 years.It is found that the higher the shareholding ratio of large shareholders,the easier it is to appear vertical interlocks of executives,and it has a negative impact on corporate value.On this basis,further research shows that vertical interlocks of executives damages enterprise value through two ways: tunneling and perks.vertical interlocks of executives who get payment from the big shareholders damage more serious;vertical interlocks of executives are more likely to damage the enterprise value if they have higher position in shareholders;the more the number of executives shareholders listed in the company,the greater the damage to corporate value.In terms of personal characteristics,female executives have relatively low damage to corporate value,and the higher the degree of education,the higher the executives do not tend to damage the value of the enterprise.Tenure plays a different role in the enterprises with different property rights.In private enterprises,the longer the tenure of the vertical interlocks of executives,the less likely they are to harm the interests of listed companies,and it's inverse in state-owned enterprises.In this paper,the influencing factors of corporate value and the research of vertical interlocks of executives' behavior are enriched,and the literature about this widespread phenomenon is enriched.It helps to perfect the corporate governance system,strengthen the supervision of capital market,maintain fair market and protect the interests of investors,and provide evidence for the formulation of relevant decisions and policies.