| From a realistic perspective,different regulatory departments hold different attitudes towards vertical interlocks of executives.To restrict large shareholders from concurrently acting as senior managers of listed companies,the China Securities Regulatory Commission has issued several regulations,such as“three separates”and “five separates”.However,State owned assets supervision and Administration Commission have different attitudes toward vertical interlocks of executives.To reduce the problem of “insider control” and eventually achieve the goal of maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned assets,the SASAC allows some state-owned enterprises to arranges the senior executives of the group company to act as the "top leaders" of the listed company in the process of key support for the reform of state-owned enterprises.From a theoretical perspective,the existing literature has studied relevant issues of the economic consequences of vertical interlocks of executives in terms of corporate value,accounting information quality,and corporate risk-taking.But there is a great difference in the conclusions of the study.Some scholars have found that vertical interlocks of executives have played a positive role in improving the quality of accounting information and the level of enterprise risk taking,but other scholars have found that vertical interlocks of executives have a negative role,which will reduce the value of the enterprise.Therefore,there is a big controversy between the reality and the theory,what is the advantage or disadvantage of vertical interlocks of executives? In this paper,to test the economic consequences of interlocks of executives,we will analyze the impact of vertical interlocks of executives on enterprises from the perspective of investment.Based on the two types of agency theory and asymmetric information theory,this paper selects 2007-2016 Shanghai and Shenzhen A share listed companies as samples.The Richardson(2006)residual model is used to measure the investment efficiency.After controlling the influence factors of the investment efficiency,the multiple regression model is used to test the impact of vertical interlocks of executives on the investment efficiency.On this basis,this paper will distinguish different effects of vertical interlocks of Chairman and executive manager on the investment efficiency.Finally,we use three ways to test the robustness of the results in order to make the conclusion more reliable.The results show that:Firstly,vertical interlocks of executives can significantly increase enterprises’ investment efficiency.As an important means of large shareholders supervise managers,vertical interlocks of executives can play an effective role in supervision.At the same time,vertical interlocks of executives can relieve the asymmetric information between large shareholders and listed companies,which can reduce the motivation of large shareholders to the listed companies.Therefore,vertical interlocks of executives will improve the investment efficiency.Secondly,after subdividing concurrent duty categorys,compared to the vertical interlocks of the executive,the vertical interlocks of the chairman has a stronger influence on the investment efficiency.Thirdly,in terms of influencing mechanism,vertical interlocks of executives can exert the "supervision effect" and "less tunneling effect",which together improve the investment efficiency.The conclusion of this paper enriches the research on the economic consequences of vertical interlocks of executives,and extends the related research on the investment efficiency and the agency problem from the perspective of vertical interlocks of executives.At the same time,in view of the disputes over the advantages and disadvantages of vertical interlocks of executives,this paper provides a good empirical evidence.The research on the vertical interlocks of executives has also provided a new way to improve the corporate governance mechanism.Therefore,this study has important theoretical and practical significance. |
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