Managerial Power,Institutional Investor Heterogeneity And Transparency Of Accounting Information

Accounting information is the ultimate reflection of corporate financial activities and operating results and it plays a vital role in the capital market.Transparent accounting information can make the internal and external stakeholders better understand the real situation of enterprises,and provide more reliable decision-making reference for their investment.It also guides the capital flow,plays the role of capital market resource allocation.However,the emergence of many financial fraud and accounting scandals shows that the transparency of accounting information in the enterprise has yet to be improved.The low transparency accounting information has seriously disturbed the normal operation of the capital market and hindered the healthy development of the economy.Since the implementation of the reform of state-owned enterprises in China,the actual control has gradually shifted to the management,coupled with the state-owned enterprises facing the "owner of the absence" of the problem,the management power has been further improved.In private enterprises,the management of the vast majority of the founder of the enterprise,which often have a higher status and power.Because of the existence of information asymmetry and agency conflict,the management as a decision maker and the accounting information provider of the enterprise is easy to breed the manipulation of accounting information disclosure to carry out the opportunistic behavior of the rent,which will produce the transparency of accounting information influences.At the same time,the internal governance of the company will affect the transparency of accounting information,external supervision will also have an impact on the transparency of accounting information.China's institutional investors after ten years of development have become an important force in the securities market,but different types of institutional investors due to investment preferences,investment philosophy,and the existence of interest companies and other differences will lead to their participation in the company governance and supervision of the existence of the distinction between,and thus affect whether it helps to enhance the transparency of accounting information.Therefore,this paper studies the influence of management power and institutional investors' heterogeneity on the transparency of accounting information,and explores the possible impact of institutional investors' heterogeneity on the relationship between management power and transparency of accounting information.This paper first reviews the definition of management authority,institutional investor heterogeneity and accounting information transparency and related research,and analyzes the relationship between management power,institutional investor heterogeneity and transparency of accounting information.Then,based on the analysis of the listed companies of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2015,the paper analyzes the comprehensive indexes of the management power from the two positions of the two sides,whether the management is holding,the size of the board,the proportion of internal directors and the degree of dividend dispersion.And other scholars to study the institutional investors will be divided into pressure-resisting institutional investors and pressure-sensitive institutional investors,while the profit margin and earnings smoothness to build a comprehensive index to measure the transparency of accounting information,empirical test of the management of the power,The Influence of Investor Heterogeneity on the transparency of Accounting Information.The results show that:First,the expansion of management power will breed its manipulation of accounting information disclosure to conduct the opportunistic behavior of rent-seeking,resulting in the transparency of accounting information decline.Second,the strong independent pressure to resist institutional investors can play a corresponding external governance role,to enhance the transparency of accounting information;pressure-sensitive institutional investors to enhance the transparency of accounting information has no significant role in promoting.Third,pressure-resisting institutional investors can mitigate the negative impact of management power on the transparency of accounting information;pressure-sensitive institutional investors do not have that effect.Finally,some suggestions are put forward according to the research in this paper:strengthening corporate governance,restraining management self-interest behavior,optimizing institutional investor institutions,cultivating long-term investment philosophy,and improving information disclosure mechanism.This article enriches the research on managerial power,accounting information transparency and other related fields,but also provides a certain reference for the enterprises to rationally allocate the management power,improve the corporate governance mechanism and optimize the institutional structure of the investors,and perfect the senior management personnel and the oversight mechanism.