Research On Optimal Allocation Of Residual Control Right In Farmer Professional Cooperatives

In this paper,the research on residual control power of farmer cooperatives is taken as the starting point to discuss the optimal allocation model of residual control power of farmer cooperatives in our country.At present,there are three allocation modes of "democratic decision-making type","major shareholder control type" and "producer sharing type" in allocating the remaining control right of cooperatives.Each mode has some rationality,but also has its own defects And hidden dangers.Based on the analysis and comparison of the three modes,we find that no one model can well solve the conflict of interest among members of cooperatives.In this paper,cooperatives are regarded as a collection of all kinds of factor owners for common interests,and the cooperative game model is used to analyze the game of power between the elemental owners in cooperatives.Through the game analysis of the results,this paper presents a hypothesis: the optimal allocation of residual control rights of cooperatives is based on the substitutability of members' inputs into production factors.This model can be called "factor matching type".Combined with the cases of Bao-Green Vegetable Cooperative,this paper empirically analyzes the "factor matching" hypothesis and verifies the feasibility of the "factor matching" model of residual control of cooperatives.The first chapter of this thesis is an introduction,including the research background,the theoretical and practical significance of the research,the purpose and method of the research,the framework of the article and possible contributions and deficiencies.The second chapter is about the definition of the concept and The literature review focuses on the conceptual definition of the core members and ordinary members of the cooperative,the residual control rights and the residual claims,as well as the research on the existing configuration of the residual control rights.The third chapter is the research approach and analysis framework and the research Hypothesis,this paper deduces two subjects of the allocation of residual control rights from the existing research,and uses the cooperative game model tocarry out the game between the two different subjects on the configuration of residual control rights.Based on this,Hypothesis of principle configuration of factor substitutability.The fourth chapter is the empirical analysis of the case.Based on the game model and the research hypothesis,this paper verifies the research hypothesis by analyzing the allocation of the residual control rights of the professional cooperatives in Luyuan Vegetable Cooperative.The fifth chapter is the conclusion of the full text,which is composed of the conclusions,revelations and future research directions.The research found that:(1)The "one man,one vote" model of democratic decision-making does not have the practical conditions in reality,and the complete capital-factor-led cooperatives(controlling shareholder)and complete non-capital factor-,But only in the capital factor markets and non-capital factor markets are clear when the special circumstances;(2)to maintain the residual control and residual claims under the same circumstances,the remaining control of cooperatives can be divided;(3)cooperatives The size of residual control that an internal factor investor owns is determined by the degree of substitutability of the element in the market(relative to repurchase costs)and is negatively correlated;(4)The quality of agricultural products,the scale of operation and the supply of raw materials will be the key factors that influence whether the cooperatives allocate the residual control power according to the input factors of production.The conclusions of this paper have very important reference significance for optimizing the governance structure of cooperatives,preventing the control of major shareholders and improving the market competitiveness of cooperatives.In this regard,some policy suggestions are put forward.