Research On The Supervision Of P2P Credit Industry In China Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

In recent years,with the rapid development of the Internet,P2P credit industry,as one of the Internet financial industry,has also been booming.However,with the rapid growth of the number of platforms,problems have begun to emerge,the platform bad debts,running,overdue and other malignant events emerge in endlessly.According to the ”2016 annual report " Chinese network lending industry shows that in 2016 this year,the cumulative number of business and platform up to 1741,and the total comprehensive income net loan platform rate was 10.45%,compared with2015 overall yields fell 2.84 percentage points.The main reason for this problem is that the current credit reporting system is not perfect,and the legal status of P2P credit platform is not clear.At present our country’s P2P credit industry is not the basis of legislation,the regulatory agencies only within its purview to supervise,P2P credit industry into the threshold low,resulting in the industry platform has regular uneven in quality,the platform also exist inflated profits,the information disclosure of internal control deficiencies and the limited capacity of the company.Even in the platform for the purpose of fraud,serious damage to the interests of investors,hindered the healthy development of P2P credit industry;at the same time,China’s current credit system is not perfect,P2P credit platform company is not compliance channels directly call on the central bank’s personal credit records,credit lending platform audit of general online the borrower complete,even if the credit platform central bank personal credit records,only including personal loans and personal credit card.The information is extremely limited.Based on the imperfect credit information system and incomplete personal credit information,the author thinks that under the circumstances that the information on the P2P credit platform is very limited,the borrower should conduct the offline audit.At the same time,in order to prevent the P2P credit lending platform in order to trading volume or additional revenue and to take the risk to unqualified borrowers lending,financial regulatory structure should be whether the P2P platform for the implementation of " credit line audit supervision.This paper is divided into five chapters.The first chapter is the introduction,which mainly introduces the background,significance,research methods,framework,innovation and shortcomings of the paper,and combs and summarizes the relevant literature at home and abroad.The second chapter introduces the related theories of P2P and P2P in the regulation of credit,P2P regulation theory,introduces the changes of the financial supervision theory,a simple analysis and comparison of British and American P2P regulatory mechanism;P2P credit theory,first defines the concept of credit P2P,and introduced a credit allocation based on P2P the model of transaction cost and information asymmetry.The third chapter is the development and supervision status of P2P credit industry in China,and mainly introduces the background of the three parties in the paper.The fourth chapter is the game model of borrowers,P2P companies and financial regulators,which is the main part of this paper.This chapter is divided into two parts: the first is the analysis of the three party static game,and Nash equilibrium of game solution is related to economic interpretation;secondly,analysis of three long-term dynamic game,including the introduction of evolutionary game theory,the dynamic analysis of the evolutionary game,the three party evolution game equilibrium analysis.The fifth chapter is the conclusion and policy recommendations,on the basis of the analysis of the conclusions of the paper put forward three suggestions: improve the personal credit information system,reduce the supervision unit supervision cost,and appropriately raise the unit penalty.This thesis research significance: China is still in the separate supervision of the financial supervision mode,while the P2P credit industry involves a number of financial business,a number of regulatory agencies,so it is necessary to further clarify the regulatory system and the regulatory body;through the research of P2P lending behavior and regulation is conducive to promoting the stability of the financial system.In the absence of specific regulatory P2P specific guidance under the condition of P2P credit platform is mainly based on the internal risk control mechanism of the platform itself,the operation risk,once the P2P platform there is a cash flow problem,the P2P platform is a small range of bankruptcy may lead to regional financial risk,and thus induce systemic risk.The implementation of P2P credit supervision and the construction of macro prudential supervision system canprevent and avoid systemic financial risks,and maintain the stability of the financial market.The possible innovations of this paper are as follows:(1)there are few literatures in this research method,and the P2P game regulation is studied from the perspective of evolutionary game theory.This paper attempts to combine the traditional method and the evolutionary game between the borrowers,the P2P platform and the financial supervision institutions of the three mixed Nash equilibrium and long-term dynamic game analysis,schematic diagram and gives the three population dynamic trend.(2)the content of this paper,because the Chinese credit information system is not perfect,therefore,it is necessary to analyze the importance of the borrower audit related information under the P2P lending platform in china.Few previous studies on economic behavior from the perspective of supervision of P2P lending,this paper will discuss the methods to game behavior factors of borrowers,P2P lending platform and financial regulators how to influence their choice of optimal operation strategy of probability.