A Study On The Recycling Decision Of Regular Electronic Recyclers And Informal Recyclers

The dual pressure of environmental pollution and waste of resources has led people to pay more attention to the recycling and reuse of electronic waste.Many countries have successively issued laws and policies on the recycling of electronic waste,so as to standardize the recycling of electronic waste and promote the development of circular economy.However,we do not have a set of effective laws to restrict the behavior of recyclers,and the recovery system is not complete and the recycling market is disordered.Formal recyclers can only recover one or two percent of electronic waste on the market.Most of the electronic waste flows into informal recyclers and eventually flows into informal dismantling channels.Non-formal dismantling operators have caused serious damage to the social environment through informal dismantling.How to guide the recovery behavior of informal recyclers and formal recyclers,promote the standardized recycling and recycling of electronic waste,and reduce environmental pollution and waste of resources are urgent issues.Firstly,using evolutionary game to analyze the recycling strategy selection of informal recyclers with bounded rationality,and the boundless rationality of the formal recycler's decision based on the informal recycler's choice.The analysis of the two recycling groups show that: in the fierce competitive market environment,informal recyclers pursue the maximization of personal interests.From the long-term development trend,their evolutionary stabilization strategies tend to be “Non-cooperative”.When formal recycler face the “Non-cooperative” strategy of informal recyclers,the “Boycott” benefits outweigh the costs,the regular stable recycler's evolutionary stabilization strategy is “Resist” and vice versa “Do not resist”.Secondly,construct the profit function under formal recycler and informal recycler under different cooperation conditions,and compare the profit differences under these conditions through numerical simulation.The results show that: in a competitive environment,recyclers' competition is proportional to the recycling price,and it is inversely proportional to recovery and recovery profit.Excessive competition is not conducive to long-term development among recyclers.From the perspective of cooperation,the profit obtained by recyclers when both parties take cooperation is the largest,and cooperation is beneficial to the increase of profits of recyclers.Therefore,it is necessary to supervise the uncooperative behavior of the recycler group and promote the cooperation between the formal recycler and the informal recycler.Finally,the government play an important role in the supervision of the ecological environment.In order to guide formal recyclers and informal recyclers to choose “Cooperation” strategies to promote cooperation between them,considering the cooperation between formal recyclers and informal recyclers under the government's supervision by evolutionary game.Based on the profits of recyclers calculated in this paper,an evolutionary game model of recyclers' groups under government awards and penalties is constructed.Through the analysis of evolutionary stability,the evolutionary stabilization strategy for formal recyclers and informal recyclers under government supervision is “Cooperation”,indicating that government incentives and penalties are effective for promoting cooperation between recycler groups.