Study On Interest Game Of Informal Recycling Subjects Of Waste Food Under Different Regulatory Perfection

With the continuous progress of society and the gradual improvement of people's living standards,people pay more and more attention to the recycling of waste food.The improper recycling of waste food will not only damage people's health,but also pollute the environment and waste resources.But at present,the attention on the informal recycling of waste food needs to be raised.This has led to the aggravation of the phenomenon of informal recycling of waste food and the wanton circulation of waste food in the market.At present,the phenomenon of informal recycling of waste food in our country is serious,the relevant laws and regulations are not perfect,the division of supervisory responsibility of supervisors is not clear.Most of the informal recyclers have carried out informal recycling,processing and marketing of waste food with the goal of maximizing their interests.Therefore,in view of the present situation of informal recycling of waste food in China,this paper analyses the problem of informal recycling of waste food by constructing an optimization model for the interests of informal recyclers and an evolutionary game model between informal recyclers and regulators,and puts forward effective countermeasures to promote and improve the formal recycling of waste food in China.It has important significance.Firstly,this paper analyses the current situation and existing problems of waste food recycling in China,and cxombs the relevant laws and policies of food safety supervision in China.Then,it builds the benefit optimization model of informal recyclers,and draws the benefit source of informal recyclers for informal recycling.Further,evolutionary game analysis is carried out for informal recyclers,basic supervisory departments and higher supervisory departments.By solving the game model and the stability of the analysis results,the theoretical basis is provided for solving the problem of informal recycling of waste food in China,the basis is provided for dividing the functions and powers of various supervisory departments,and the formulation of informal recycling of waste food is provided.Firstly,this paper establishes an optimization model based on the current situation of irregular recyclers'violation of discarded food in China.Aiming at the approximate perfect competition market made up of irregular recyclers,it establishes an optimization model for the expected total profit of irregular recyclers of discarded food,and analyses the camouflage action power and recovery rate decision of irregular recyclers' violation of discarded food resale,so as to analyze discarded food.Benefit-driven root causes of product recycling problems.The results show that:When both the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the primary and the higher supervision departments tend to be negative,the rate of the higher supervision departments tending to be stable decreases with the improvement of the primary supervision;when the evolutionary stabilization strategies of the higher supervision departments or the grass-roots supervision departments tend to be positive,the higher supervision departments tend to be stable.The rate of point increases with the improvement of supervision of grass-roots supervision departments.The innovation of this paper is mainly embodied in the use of benefit optimization model to analyze the benefits of informal recyclers,and introduce the different scale returns of informal recyclers into the model.At the same time,the evolutionary game theory is used to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of informal recyclers,grass-roots regulatory authorities and higher regulatory authorities.In the model,the regulatory perfection factor is added for the first time.Through the stability equilibrium analysis of the replication dynamic equation,the stakeholder relationship among the three factors and the impact of the regulatory perfection level on the three factors are obtained,thus the stable equilibrium strategy under different conditions is obtained.Through the analysis of informal recyclers and their stakeholders,it provides a strong basis for solving the problem of informal recycling of waste food in China.