Study On The Supervision Mechanism Of Government On The Environmental Protectionof Industrial Enterprises-from The Perspective Of The Game Theory

The Abstract Industrial enterprises are an important part of China's national economy,and they are also the largest source of pollution.Since the founding of the People's Republic of China,the industrialization process has been accelerating,which brings rapid economic growth and substantial damages to the environment at the meantime.Over the recent years,the Chinese government has placed increasing weight on environmental protection.However,the country has heavily depended on the development mode that economic growth is at the expenses of the environment,therefore huge costs will incur for the transformation of development mode.Some local authorities have not done sufficient work in the environmental supervision,and major environmental pollution incidents occasionally occur.In order to improve government's environmental supervision on industrial enterprises,there is the need to deeply understand in theory the functional mechanism of government supervision activities.Previous studies emphasize the unidirectional effects of government on industrial enterprises and overlook the interactive relationship between them.This article analyzes,by applying the game theory,the interactive decisions among industrial enterprises under given environmental protection policies,as well as the interactive decisions between the government as one party and the industrial enterprises as the other.By establishing the econometrics model based on the transprovincial panel data of the state,this article carries out empirical test on the game theoryguided analysis in the end.On the basis of the game model among the industrial enterprises,this article concludes that:(1)the environmental externalities of industrial enterprises makes the Nash equilibrium pollution exceeds the Pareto Optimality pollution,which leads to the tragedy of the commons;(2)the environmental externalities occasionally make the industrial enterprises of monopoly position to better satisfy the requirements of social wellness;(3)to increase the environmental tax rate will bring down the production as well as the pollution of industrial enterprises,and cause them to increase environmental protection investment;(4)when environmental protection companies provide pollution treatment service of flat rate,the only effects of lowering the discharging limit are to stimulate the environmental protection industry rather than bringing down the production and the pollution treated by the industrial enterprises themselves.Based on the game model between the government and the industrial enterprises,this article concludes that(1)the lower cost of pollution treatment by industrial enterprises,the higher benefits will yield;the heavier punishment for illegally discharging pollution,the more likely will the government be negligent on the environmental supervision.(2)the effects of the environmental externalities of the pollution discharging on the public,the higher environmental tax rate will be levied by the government.At the meantime,a lower limit will be imposed on the pollution discharging,and more subsidies will be provided to industrial enterprises for the treatment of pollution.