Study On The Oil Import Export Quota Allocation Mechanism In China By Using Game-theoretic Model

In February 2015,the National Development and Reform Commission issued the new policy that allowing independent refineries to use imported crude oil and crude oil import right after they eliminate backward production capacity,and the independent refineries also obtain the right to export product oil so that their sales channels increase.Oil import and export liberalization promotes the rapid development of independent refineries,and the market share is gradually increasing.So the domestic competition in oil market has changed.However,the increasing imported crude oil from independent refineries will raise crude oil external dependence that is more than 60%,which exerts nagetive impact on China's energy security.Therefore,it is an urgent need to set up an optimalimport and export quota mechanism,which can not only realize the maximization of social welfare,but also alleviate the problem of domestic energy security.In this paper,a analysis model is proposed based on the game theory including government,consumers,state-owned enterprises and independent refineries.Three price scenarios are proposed to analyze the competitiveness of state owned enterprises and independent refineries at different crude oil price levels.The impact of changes in crude oil import quotas and export quotas on the market participants are analyzed quantitatively.Furtermore,we obtain the optimized combinations of import quotas and export quotas to achieve the maximization of social welfare in different price situations,so we can provide optimal quota mechanism for the government to further promote the domestic refined oil market reform process.At the same time,the increase of import and export quota increases the foreign trade risk.Finally,the import and export risks of different enterprises are compared in the different price levels,then we put forward corresponding measures to reduce risks.Base on a series of analysis and calculation,we conclude that:(1)When we maximize the welfare of society,the lower the price of crude oil,the greater the need for import and export quotas;(2)The total social welfare is highest in the high price situation;(3)It is favorable for state-owned companies to purchase product oil from independent refineries in the lower price condition;(4)The risk cost of independent refineries is always much lower than that of state-owned enterprises in different price scenarios;(5)The risk cost of independent refineries is lowest in the high price situation.Based on these conclusions,we believe that the current international oil prices close to the low price situation,China's import and export quotas is close to the optimal quota mechanism.We suggest that the government should release proper export qutoas when independent refineries need to export;in the medium price scenarios we suggest that the government should liberalize import and export rights,in order to protect the market position of state-owned enterprises and strengthen the market competition;in the high price scenario,it is advised the government to tighten quotas,supporting state-owned enterprises and maximizing social welfare.