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Differential Game Model For Optimal Supply Of Disaster Emergency Rescue

Posted on:2019-06-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J Y LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2381330572461402Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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With the rapid economic development of human society,the impact of activity capacity on natural areas,the impact of resource exploitation on geology and other environmental damage is increasing,disaster events.Since the last century,changes in the global climate have caused natural disasters to continue to occur.The uncontrollable nature of disasters has affected human society more and more.This has resulted in the destruction of the development results of local regions and even the entire country,which has greatly hindered the development of human society.After the disaster occurred,the government immediately participated in the disaster relief.In the face of the uncertainty of the demand for emergency supplies" and the uncertainty of the demand in the disaster area,the supply of goods was also limited to factors such as supply costs and supply efficiency.influences.When the shortage of goods is relatively small,the demand for emergency supplies in the disaster-stricken areas has been largely met.At this time,the supply of excess emergency supplies will result in additional costs due to storage and poor management.When the volume of goods is large,the supply of emergency supplies should meet the needs of the disaster area as much as possible to improve the rescue situation.Therefore,how to determine the supply quantity and the supply decision taken has become one of the important issues that governments and companies need to consider.Emergency materials are used as relief supplies to participate in disasters.According to the special nature of medical supplies,the status of each period will be affected by the degree of recovery of the disaster victims.That is,changes in the demand for emergency supplies in the disaster area will change with time,reflecting the lack of disaster areas.In terms of shipment volume,the volume of missing goods has a great influence on the decision-making behavior of governments and enterprises.The government encourages enterprises to participate in disaster relief by providing enterprises with part of the supply subsidies to jointly improve the supply of demand in the disaster area and effectively improve the status of missing goods.This paper analyzes the optimal supply model of emergency supplies and uses differential game to analyze.At the same time,it constructs a differential game in which the government and the company participate in the disaster rescue together with various benefits such as the benefits from the supply process and the incidental supply costs.Models,analyze how to determine their optimal supply decisions.The specific research work and conclusions include the following two points:First,build a differential game model under which the government and the company jointly adopt open-loop control strategies.First,according to the relationship formed by disaster relief after rescue,the government acts as a rescue subject and takes on the role of aleader.By providing a certain supply cost subsidy and stimulating the participation of enterprises as followers in the rescue,government leadership is formed.Starkberg's differential game model.A stable open-loop Nash equilibrium solution can be obtained,and the government's supply quantity is proportional to its unit revenue and supply efficiency caused by emergency supplies,and inversely proportional to the supply cost.In addition,consideration was also given to the rescue situation when the government did not adopt cost subsidies and obtained corresponding conclusions.Second,under the improvement of the basic model,the decision-making behavior of the governrnment and the company will be changed to a feedback strategy.At this time,the government and the enterprise can adjust their own supply strategies based on changes in the current status of the shortage of goods.In the feedback strategy,the impact of time consistency on decision-making is removed,and according to the characteristics of the decision-making process of both sides of the game,an inverse solution method is used to obtain the response function of the enterprise and substitute the Hamilton function constructed by the government to obtain the optimal supply quantity of the government.The optimal solution,but also to the best supply cost subsidy value,therefore,according to the supply cost subsidy value can get the company's optimal solution.The main innovations of this article are as follows:(1)Apply the differential game model approach to disaster relief,consider the government's different supply-subsidy ratios,the decision-making behavior of governments and enterprises,and analyze the supply efficiency and supply costs as well as the unit revenue for the government.As well as the impact of the company's optimal supply decision;(2)Under different supply strategy models,from the perspective of two different information structures,analyze the supply behavior of the government and the company under open-loop control strategy and feedback control strategy respectively,and analyze that the government and the company face different supply.The optimal supply quantity under the goods subsidy and the effect of various parameters on the efficiency of the rescue and the optimal efficiency of the government and the company.
Keywords/Search Tags:emergency supplies, differential game, open-loop Nash equilibrium, feedback strategy, cost sharing
PDF Full Text Request
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