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The Study Of Carbon Emissions Issue Based On The Differential Game

Posted on:2016-08-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X HeFull Text:PDF
GTID:2191330470983323Subject:Applied Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the increasing intensity of Global Warming Effect, the low carbon economy cycle mode has received general attention. The implement of carbon tax, the trade of carbon emission rights as well as low carbon emission reduction mechanism of supply chain all have become a heated topic in theoretical circle and practice circle under such circumstances of low carbon economy. As to the emission of carbon dioxide, there exist game relation between local government and enterprise, large companies and small ones, factories and suppliers in a various way of cooperation, subordination and non-cooperation, etc. Therefore, considering the policy related to the carbon emission, the emission of carbon dioxide actually is a dynamic process of game relation between different decision makers. This essay analyzes the game agents’ choice behaviors by taking advantage of the theory of differential game. Following are the details.First of all, we’ve established the game model between government and enterprise and gained feedback Nash equilibrium. We can come to the conclusion that, on one hand, the efforts of local government to deal with contamination has close relationship with the degree of rewards and punishments from upper controller, with the cost of local government to resolve contamination and with their environmental protection performance, etc. On the other hand, by raising the carbon tax, strengthening the efforts of regulating contamination and increasing the punishment level all can help to decrease the carbon emission.Secondly, considering the different position the large firm and the small ones have been in the trade of carbon emission, we’ve set up the differential game model of big firms and small ones, and gained the balance strategy in that problem. The result indicates that the price the carbon emission rights and that the product has different impact on the large enterprises and small enterprises.Last but not the least, this essay analyzes the dynamic optimization of carbon emission reduce between manufacturers and suppliers. We’ve establish the differential game model and gained Nash equilibrium strategy under three choice types of manufacturers and suppliers non-cooperated, subordinated and operated relationship. By comparison and analysis, the reduction of carbon emission under cooperation mode is superior to other two modes in both the volume of reduction as well as the optimal value of profits.
Keywords/Search Tags:Carbon emissions, Carbon tax, Carbon emissions trade, Differential game, Feedback Nash equilibrium
PDF Full Text Request
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