Research On Intermodal Freight Virtual Enterprise Constructed By Railway Freight And Logistics Companies

With the economic development,the rapid development of social logistics,in the face of more and more express delivery and other LTL cargo market,railway freight and logist ics companies want to compete for more markets.However,the two are facing more and more problems,such as difficult to open up the market,difficult to cut cost,service is difficult to improve and other issues.Therefore,the cooperation between railway freight transport and social logistics enterprises has gradually become a trend.They have cooperated in combined transport.How to coordinate the combined transport of railway freight and social logist ics enterprises.How to resolve the contradiction between individual rationality and collective rationality.How to resolve the conflicts caused by the uncoordinated development of cooperation with the cooperation.The problems are key to ensure the combined transportatio n development of railway freight and social logistics enterprises.Therefore,in the face of the ever-changing new market environment,the scientific analysis of the behavioral relations hip between multiple independent individuals,such as,reveals the interaction between railway freight and social logistics companies has realistic implications and positive significance for the cooperation of new logistics markets.The paper analyzes the combined transportation of railway freight and social logist ics companies with the perspective of the organizational structure of virtual enterprises and studies the game strategies of the three levels of service-pricing strategy,incentive contract design,and profit distribution strategy between railway freight companies and social logist ics companies.In the research,game theory and modern optimization theory are used as the main research tools,and quantitative and qualitative methods are used as research methods.The main content of the paper.1.Researched the competitive and cooperative relationship between the complementar y virtual railway freight and logistics companies and use the two-phase game of service,and pricing to analyze their respective service pricing strategies under non-cooperative conditions and cooperation.It can be concluded that the total return under the state of cooperation in the virtual enterprise is greater than that of the non-cooperative state,and the combined transport state is superior to the non-cooperative state.Moreover,the pricing under cooperation is also lower than that of non-cooperative state.This is also an advantage for virtual companies and is more conducive to market competition.However,after the cooperation,the service levels of both parties are lower than those of non-cooperative states.It requires some contractual mechanism to restrict it.The paper also coordinates the overall interests in accordance with the profit sharing coordination mechanism in order to ensure the stability of the virtual enterprise.2.The paper analyzes the internal incentive mechanism of the virtual enterprise,and studies when the railway freight company is the chief of the al iance and considers the information symmetry and information asymmetry between the two subordinate logist ics enterprises and divides the two companies into cooperation and competition.In the case of contractual mechanism design,and using simulation analysis: In the case of informa t io n symmetry,railway freight transport companies under the contract mechanism set the same model revenue;logistics companies have reached an optimal level of effort;market risks are also zero.In the case of symmetrical information,when the revenue is taken into account,the return of the non-relative performance design contract provided by the railway freight enterprise is smaller than the benefit when the relative performance design contract is provided;when the risk is considered,the total amount of the non-relative performance design contract provided by the railway freight company is considered.The risk is greater than the total risk when providing a relative performance design contract.When two logistics companies cooperate,the interests of railway freight companies will be greatly damaged.3.The article considers and analyzes the Shapley value method that is commonly used in the existing method of profit distribution,and points out that it considers the disadvantages of fairness and uneven distribution,and analyzes the differences between railway freight companies and participating logistics companies.Three main differences were found: the degree of service improvement,the risk intensity,and the level of contract compliance.And according to the three differences proposed amendments,given three kinds of amendments to a certain weight,in the end can be more practical for the three participating companies from the virtual enterprise to share the final return.Through analysis,it is proved that the scheme is more fair and reasonable and more realistic.