Research On The Competition Relationship Between High-speed Railway And Civil Aviation Based On Non-cooperative Game

Today,the development of high-speed railways is very rapid,which inevitably has a huge impact and challenge to the traditional civil aviation market.Therefore,civil aviation has taken various measures to cope with the momentum of high-speed rail.Railway bureaus and airlines compete for passenger flow by price war,which eventually leads to the loss of both carriers.Therefore,studying the competitive relationship between high-speed rail and civil aviation,and analyzing the pricing strategies of both,can avoid the vicious competition between the two,improve transportation efficiency and competitiveness,and provide reference for the development and operation of the two.In view of the above problems,this paper aims at maximizing the total revenue,establishes a competitive game model between high-speed railway and civil aviation,and explores the issue of reasonable fare formulation between China's high-speed railway and civil aviation.Firstly,the relevant theories of disaggregated model are sorted out and analyzed,and the general form of Logit model describing passenger choice behavior is deduced by utilitarian maximization theory,and the passenger flow prediction model is proposed.Secondly,the influencing factors of passenger choice of travel mode are divided into two categories:passenger's own attributes and traffic mode attributes.Through the concrete analysis of these two attributes,four factors,comfort,rapidity,convenience and economy,are selected to study the travel utility of passengers.The concept of time economic value is introduced to quantify the time variables.According to the utility theory,the utility model of passenger travel choice is established.On this basis,combined with the disaggregated theory,the utility model reflecting high-speed railway and civil aviation is established.The BL(Binary-Logit)model of passenger transport sharing rate is used to analyze the passenger flow competition between the two modes.Then,using game theory to study the competitive relationship between high-speed rail and civil aviation,combining with passenger travel utility function and BL model,and considering operation cost,enterprise income and government surplus,the two-stage game model with enterprise income and social total benefit as the goal is established,and heuristic algorithm is designed to solve the optimal fare strategy of high-speed rail and civil aviation.Finally,taking the Wuhan-Guangzhou high-speed passenger corridor as an example,empirical analysis is carried out to verify the validity of the model.The results show that high-speed rail has obvious advantages in short-distance transportation,but with the increase of distance,the competitive advantage of high-speed rail decreases and the market share decreases,while the competitive advantage of civil aviation increases and the market share rises,indicating that civil aviation has a greater advantage in long-distance transportation.In addition,under the same distance conditions,when the ultimate game equilibrium solution is obtained with the goal of maximizing enterprise revenue,the high-speed rail fare rises,the market share falls,and the enterprise income rises;the civil aviation fare falls,the market share rises,and the enterprise income rises.When the final game equilibrium solution is obtained with the goal of maximizing the total social benefit,the high-speed rail fare decreases,the market share decreases,and the total social benefit rises;the civil aviation fare decreases,the market share rises,and the total social benefit rises.And civil aviation has more corporate benefits than high-speed rail,and high-speed rail has more social benefits than civil aviation.