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Research On Cooperative Game Of Urban Public Bicycle System

Posted on:2021-03-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X S AnFull Text:PDF
GTID:2392330605460951Subject:Transportation planning and management
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As China's economy continues to develop and the number of motor vehicles continues to increase,the contradiction between people's need for efficient,energy-saving,green travel and the imbalanced,insufficient development of urban traffic is becoming increasingly acute.In recent years,the establishment of the urban slow traffic system has been paid more and more attention by all parties as an important measure to solve the "last mile" of urban transportation.However,the urban public bicycle system,which is an important part of the slow traffic system,has encountered development bottlenecks in the context of the "sharing economy",resulting in the economic externalities such as the shrinking of the traditional public bicycle market,the brutal growth of shared bicycles,the lack of public awareness and the absence of management policies.To solve these externalities,it should start from the perspectives of enterprises,government,markets,etc.,and conduct research with the goal of promoting mutually complementary and collaborative cooperation to achieve the collective optimal results.Firstly,by studying the literature of domestic and foreign in the relevant fields and combing the existing problems in the development of domestic public bicycles,the internal relationship between the problems and economic externalities is summarized,and a solution which is eliminating competition and collaboration to internalize economic externalities is obtained.Using the relevant knowledge of game theory,the stakeholders involved in the urban public bicycle system,namely the enterprise and the government,are determined.By comparing the differences between the two types of game theory,the research sequence from non-cooperative games to cooperative games is clarified.Secondly,based on the classic Cournot duopoly model and the Stackelberg model,a non-cooperative game model for urban public bicycle systems is constructed.By solving the equilibrium strategies of the two types of model,the revenue functions of public bicycle operating companies under cooperation and competition strategies are obtained.Based on the theory of welfare economics,the role of the government in this game is clarified and the government's benefits are quantified.Thirdly,in order to promote cooperation and realize the superadditivity of the alliance,the alliance-type cooperative game model of the urban public bicycle system is constructed and the Shapley value method is used to obtain the payoffs distribution vector through the above-mentioned gains from the players.Because this method ignored the "free-rider" payoffs generated by the government during the game,on the basis of this method,an improved partition function-type cooperative game model is introduced and solved using the consensus value method.Using the MDP indicator to evaluate the above two results,and then throughthe idea of the MDP indicator,a marginal contribution weighted payoffs distribution algorithm is constructed.In addition,considering the fact that the market size has been reduced in stages due to the durability of public bicycles,an improved urban public bicycle system dynamic game model based on the Cournot model is constructed and solved by computer programming.The stage launch strategies of the two operators and the changes of the market size along with the launch process are simulated.Finally,taking Lanzhou as an example,the practicability of the improved dynamic game of the urban public bicycle system is examined;the validity and scientificity of the Shapley value and the consensus value distribution for promoting the cooperation of the major coalition are examined.Through research,it is verified that non-cooperative game problems can be transformed into cooperative game problems and solved by certain conditional assumptions.It is verified that the players in the urban public bicycle system can achieve the collective optimal rational result through cooperation.For non-super-additive cooperative game models,the consensus value distribution strategy can make cooperation more stable.The dynamic game of the urban public bicycle system can be used as a tool to predict the market size and guide the orderly launch of enterprises.It provides a feasible solution for non-cooperative games and cooperative game research in this field.
Keywords/Search Tags:Bicycle-sharing, Game Theory, Cooperative Game Theory, Shapley Value, Consensus Value
PDF Full Text Request
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