Evolutionary Game Analysis Of Energy-saving Retrofit Stakeholders For Existing Buildings Under Government Regulation

China’s building energy consumption accounts for more than one-third of the total energy consumption of the whole society,and it presents a trend of increasing year by year,so building energy conservation is extremely urgent.Compared with new buildings,the existing buildings have the characteristics of large building stock and high building energy consumption,so they have greater energy saving potential.But at present,China’s existing building energy-saving retrofit work is still moving forward slowly.To investigate its root,how the government makes effective incentive and restraint policies to promote the active and extensive participation of stakeholders in existing building energy-saving retrofit is an urgent problem to be solved in order to promote the healthy development of existing building energy-saving retrofit.Therefore,in order to promote the development of existing building energy-saving retrofit in China,based on stakeholders and evolutionary game theories,this paper establishes several evolutionary game models among stakeholders of existing building energy-saving retrofit under the government regulation and discusses it in depth.The research results will provide a basis for the formulation of government policies and promote the development of China’s existing building energy-saving retrofit.Firstly,this paper elaborates the related concepts,market composition,stakeholders and influencing factors of energy-saving retrofit of existing buildings,analyzes the market characteristics of it,and forms the theoretical basis of this paper.Then,the paper analyzes the development status of energy-saving retrofit of existing buildings in China,including the status quo of existing buildings,the status quo of institutional mechanisms,the status quo of the completion of retrofit goal and energy-saving service industry development,etc.,and puts forward the problems and challenges of energy-saving retrofit of existing buildings in China,and looks forward to the future development prospects,forming the realistic basis of this study.Finally,according to the theoretical basis and realistic basis of the above analysis,based on the bounded rationality hypothesis,the evolutionary game model between the main stakeholders of the existing building energy-saving retrofit is constructed,including the evolutionary game model between central government and local government,owners and tenants,governmentsand owners,ESCO groups,owners and ESCO,the evolutionary stability strategy and the key factors influencing the evolution result are discussed.The Matlab software is used to simulate the evolution process and propose the optimization direction.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: different evolutionary game models have different evolutionary stability strategies under different initial conditions,which correspond to different stages of the development of the energy-saving retrofit of existing buildings market.The government can formulate corresponding incentive and constraint policies accordingly,to promote the development of the existing building energy conservation transformation market.The strategic choice of stakeholders is influenced by their own benefits and the strategic choice of other stakeholders.In the evolutionary game models,the government’s incentive and constraint policies are the common key factors affecting the strategic choice of stakeholders.Therefore,policy recommendations are put forward from three aspects : government policies should be diversified in stages;improve the participation of stakeholders;strengthen the guidance of market means.