Research On The Optimization Of Corporate Environmental Audit Strategy From The Perspective Of Stakeholder

As an important part of social and economic development,large-scale power generation enterprises have undertaken social and economic responsibilities and made great contributions to maintaining the steady development of China’s economy.They often have a significant impact on the environment and have a negative effect on the surrounding environment.Countries "difference" outline will also clear environmental audit target,ideas and measures are put forward,the environment audit behavior has become the new direction of the audit work,the government attaches great importance to the environment audit behavior,strengthening the supervision and management responsibilities in the field of industry,the jurisdiction in a timely manner organization to supervise of audit corrective situation has become a development trend.Only by taking environmental audit as a content of restricting significance that is widely valued in enterprise operation,and strengthening the continuous supervision of environmental governance from beginning to end,can enterprises stand the test of a long time.Due to the problems of incomplete information disclosure and insufficient supervision in environmental audit,the audit process is prone to fraud and other phenomena,which makes the environmental audit quality is not high.The quality of environmental audit has a profound impact on the implementation of enterprises’ environmental policies.Non-compliant environmental audit behavior is a contempt of national laws and regulations,trampling on the principle of fair,open and just market,and seriously hindering the pace of green,healthy and high-quality development of the society.Based on the review and analysis of the existing literature,based on the environmental auditing theory,stakeholder theory and evolutionary game theory and other scientific theory,studied the environment audit of Datang international interactions between stakeholders,and by constructing a dynamic game model of evolution of the three parties to make the government as the regulators involved in environmental audit part of environment audit,The dynamic game among the third party audit institution,audited institution and government supervision department is analyzed by stability evolution game.It is found that the reciprocal behavior choice of different stakeholders is reflected in the dynamic process of interaction influence and affects the convergence trend of evolutionarily stable strategies.In this evolutionary game system,the strategic choice of any party is affected by the strategic choice of the other two parties,but the influence of the strategic choice of the government regulatory department is more from the audit quality of the third-party audit institution and the decision of the auditee’s disclosure of environmental data.The results obtained through comprehensive simulation analysis,including the interaction of strategic behavior and various factors,have reference value for the practical application of the three-party game subject of environmental audit stakeholders.Based on the case analysis of Datang International environmental audit,it is revealed that the strategic choices of different stakeholders are reflected in the dynamic process of mutual influence,and affect the convergence trend of evolutionary stability strategies.