Study On Quality Behavior Among Construction Stakeholders

As the construction industry enters a stage of high-quality development,the construction quality is playing an increasingly greater role.The quality of construction is not only related to the people's interests and investment benefits,but also the key to the sustainable and healthy development of the construction industry.At present,quality defects still exist in the construction phase,which are mainly affected by quality behavior of construction stakeholders.In fact,the degree of standard construction by the contractors and supervision by the owners and supervisors determine the level of construction quality control.However,problems,such as nonstandard construction and inadequate supervision,sometimes occur in practical construction projects,thus result in low level of project quality control.In general,the effect and efficiency of construction quality supervision effect and efficiency is not optimistic.Organization is a critical factor to realize the quality objective of construction.In China,the project owner,construction supervising engineer and construction contractor are tripartite stakeholders in regard to quality management.To solve the organizational problems of quality supervision,two models were established to analyze the uncertainty about quality behavior option among tripartite stakeholders.Firstly,this paper proposed a system dynamics(SD)model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the interactions among the stakeholders in quality management.Research from an organizational behavior perspective focused on changes about quality behavior among stakeholders.Secondly,an influencing factor model of supervision behavior based on the theory of planned behavior(TPB)is built.From the angle of individual behavior,influence factors of supervision behavior and the relationships among them had been studied in the light of remarks from quality management staff working for diverse project owners.The results show that 1)the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in the initial interactions between the stakeholders;2)two external variables(supervision cost,the degree of punishment and reward)changes of the owner have a great effect on the contractor's rate variable;3)the dynamic penalty-incentive scenario can effectively restrain the fluctuations and improve the stability of the proposed model.These results reflect the practical significance that the owner has a greater impact on the contractor in quality management.In addition,the supervisor fails to regulate and even has a negative effect on the owner's supervision when it colludes with the contractor.What's more,the dynamic penalty-incentive implementation can guarantee the contractor to achieve quality goals only under the supervision of the owner.4)Subjective norm and perceived behavior control are the two most important determinants of supervision behavior and supervision intention plays a mediating role in the relation between the two factors and the behavior.