Deterrence Theory And Its Application To Cyberspace

Computer networks are an increasingly vital part of modern society, and the United States in particular is heavily reliant on computer networks. U.S. banks, power grids, transportation systems, communication infrastructure, and water treatment systems are becoming more connected, and many of these systems can be accessed from cyberspace. Despite the major economic, social, and political benefits that the United States gains from its use of computer networks, this reliance also brings with it serious risks to national security. Cyberspace as a domain of conflict is becoming more common, and the United States is one of the most vulnerable nations to cyber attack. The countless cyber attacks that target the United States on a daily basis show that traditional strategies of deterrence are failing when applied to this domain. Data for this paper was collected primarily from government documents, research institute studies, and analysis conducted by cyber security firms. Case studies were taken from media outlets and post analysis conducted by research institutions, think tanks, and cyber security firms. In order to understand the application of traditional deterrence thought, much time was put into reviewing studies on the development and effectiveness of Cold War deterrence strategies. Data gathered on the unique characteristics cyberspace will be put together with different theories of deterrence to determine what sort of deterrence strategy could be effective if applied to the domain of cyberspace. This thesis will serve three purposes. The first purpose is centered on the existence of the cyber threat and the effects it can have on national security. The following chapters will explain in detail that threats from cyberspace are and have been a reality governments have dealt with for quite some time and will explain in detail cases in which cyberspace was used as a political or military tool. The second purpose is to illustrate why certain characteristics of cyberspace complicate traditional concepts of deterrence, and how those same characteristics explain why deterrence in cyberspace has not been as successful as deterrence against other threats, such as nuclear weapons. The third and final purpose of this paper will be to push deterrence thought in a direction that can be applied to cyberspace, whether that involves applying longstanding concepts of deterrence or developing new methods of deterrence that will be unique to this new domain.