A Study On Official's Promotion Of Pressure And Government's Subsidy

Based on the perspective of political tournament theory,this paper examines the "political view" of local government with the empirical research of official government subsidy.Based on the government subsidy and financial data of Chinese listed companies from 2008 to 2014,this paper examines the subsidy of local officials under the pressure of promotion.Taking into account the local officials in the course of the service in order to maintain performance,will maintain the number of local listed companies,this article further discussion in the promotion of pressure to increase the local officials of the loss and delisting enterprises on the edge of the subsidy.In addition,this article has added the nature of property rights,the impact of market factors.Finally,it examines the effect of government subsidy,supplements the relevant research of government subsidy,and provides empirical evidence from the perspective of government subsidy to evaluate China's political promotion incentive system.Studies have shown that,first,when the promotion of pressure,local officials will increase the subsidies to enterprises,this role in the state-owned enterprises more significant.Second,in order to maintain the number of local listed companies to avoid business delisting,loss and delisting risk of state-owned enterprises will get more subsidies.Third,in the low level of market-oriented areas,local officials to increase the pressure on the state-owned enterprises to increase the phenomenon of subsidies was obvious.Fourth,government subsidies have a negative impact on the performance of state-owned enterprises,and the role of non-state enterprises is not obvious.Indicating that state-owned enterprises have a "dependency" effect on government subsidies,which is not conducive to the improvement of subsidy efficiency and the development of enterprises themselves.