Defects Of Internal Control,expectation Of Promotion And Corruption Of Senior Executives In State-owned Enterprises

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,anti-corruption has always been a hot issue.The exposure of some large state-owned enterprises' nest cases makes us have to pay attention to the mechanism behind corruption,in order to be beneficial to the inducement of corruption traps,prevention and control.Through consulting a large number of literature,the author found that the study of corruption will be more from the political level,based on the economic carrier of state-owned enterprises,the study of corruption is not many.In the literature based on the corruption of state-owned enterprise executives,analyzing corruption from the perspective of internal control is a conventional research approach;however,combined with the background of the appointment and removal system of state-owned enterprise executives in China,the "quasi official" nature of state-owned enterprise executives in China exceeds the "manager" nature,and there is a demand for political promotion.Because of the particularity of the executives in the state-owned enterprises,in addition to the key point of internal control,this paper will also focus on the expected influence of the promotion of the executives in the state-owned enterprises.Finally,this paper focuses on the relationship between internal control defects,promotion expectations and the corruption of state-owned enterprise executives.In this paper,based on the collection of 2010-2018 state-owned A-share listed companies' illegal corruption and the matching state-owned enterprises as samples,empirical research on the main effect of internal control defects and promotion expectation on the corruption of state-owned enterprises' executives,and the regulatory effect of promotion expectation on the relationship between internal control defects and corruption of state-owned enterprises' executives.In this paper,the theoretical analysis method is used to summarize the relevant domestic and foreign literature of internal control,promotion expectation and corruption of state-owned enterprise executives.Based on the qualitative analysis of relevant economic theories,the theoretical basis and hypothesis are formed.Then,the empirical analysis method is used to verify the relationship between the three.The results show that:first,there is a positive correlation between the internal control defects and the corruption of state-owned enterprise executives,and the internal control defects may induce the corruption of executives.One of the necessary ways to fight against corruption is to establish and improve the internal control system;second,if the promotion expectation of state-owned enterprise executives is high,state-owned enterprise executives will be more inclined to regulate their own practice behavior,and the promotion expectation can restrain the high level of state-owned enterprises.Third,the promotion expectation has a certain weakening effect on the positive correlation between the internal control defects and the corruption of the state-owned enterprise executives,that is,if the state-owned enterprise executives have higher promotion expectation,even if the internal control defects are serious,the induced impact of the internal control defects on the corruption will be limited to a certain extent.At last,this paper explains and enriches the research results with the case of Zhou renqiang's corruption.In the research of the corruption of state-owned enterprise executives,many scholars will involve in the internal control,but there is very little research from the perspective of promotion expectation,so this paper is a supplement to the research literature of the corruption of state-owned enterprise executives.In addition,from the perspective of promotion expectation research,the current literature focuses on the political promotion expectation of officials,so this paper is also a reference for the incentive and supervision of state-owned enterprise executives in the new round of state-owned enterprise reform.