The Impact Of Governance Structures Of Growth Enterprises Market On Inefficient Investment

According to a review of the literature among domestic and foreign research,the conclusions of the impacts of governance structures on inefficient investment are different,because of using different empirical objects.Foreign scholars used Empirical objects which are in mature and perfect capital market,while Chinese scholars researched on the board of China's listed companies or state-owned enterprises.And due to the reality of Chinese capital market and China's listed companies,Chinese scholars generally based on the perspective of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders,especially state-owned enterprises.Therefore,this thesis analyzed the characteristics of GEM,GEM listed companies'governance structures and investment behaviors,and these differences may cause GEM listed companies and inefficient investment situation which are different from those in the main-board listed companies.After defining the related concepts,detailed descriptions and analysis of governance structures and investment of GEM listed companies,these summary descriptions and objective analysis for the hypothesis is put forward and the empirical part provides the basic research.According to previous experimental study,the thesis takes the principal agent theory as the theoretical support,respectively introduces the principal-agent conflicts between shareholders and managers,major shareholders and minority shareholders.The thesis put forward the hypothesis combined with the analysis of the characteristics of GEM listed companies.Finally,referred to Richardson(2006)model to measure the GEM listed companies' inefficient investment level,and put the observations into two groups,under-investment and over-investment.The conclusion is based on the regression of governance structures and under-investment or over-investment.In conclusion,the evidence suggests that GEM governance structures are associated with underinvestment,such as CEO duality,appear to mitigate under-investment.There is insufficient evidence to show an impact on the governance structure over-investment.CEO duality by reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and managers alleviates the problem of under-investment.And there is no evidence that over-investment is associated with the agency problem.Except governance structures,over-investment is associated with other factors.And foreign scholars generally believe that the governance structures are associated with over-investment.And Chinese scholars did empirical study using the main-board listed companies' data that CEO duality could aggravate under-investment.The conclusions of the thesis are different from the existing conclusions.