Research On Coordination Strategy Of Closed-loop Supply Chain Under Conditional Value-at-Risk

Closed-loop supply chain is becaming an important topic because of its recycling through reverse logics,which can save resource and protect environment.The competition of market is more and more furious with fast development of society economy and enterprise meets more uncertainty.Most of traditonal research on recycling and remanufacture of closed-loop supply chain only maximize the decision maker's benefit,but ignore the benefit of a total system and decision maker's risk preference about uncertainty,which make enterprise practical operation strategy is different from theoretical.However,supply chain contract theory can reduce influence of uncertainty on closed-loop supply chain decision and achieve system optimal benefit such as revenue-sharing contract and buy-back contarct,thereby the members of supply chain share the revenue and risk.This paper mainly research on coordination strategy of closed-loop supply chain under decision-makers with different risk preferences and design coordination mechanism to achieve close-loop supply chain perfect coordination.Main research content is as follows:Firstly,for a closed-loop supply chain with risk-aversion retailer responsible for saling and recycling waste products,the objective function besed on conditional value-at-risk are established and the coordination problems are studied under buy-back contract and revenue-sharing contract respectively.An optimal buy-back constract and revenue-sharing contract coordination mechanism is proposed,and the closed-loop supply chain members' operation strategies and performances with the change of recycle ratio,degree of risk-aversion and constract parameters are discussed.Secondly,for a closed-loop supply chain considering the participant with different risk preferences,a closed-loop supply chain buy-back constract and revenue-sharing contract model with two risk parameters described by pessimism coefficient and degree of risk averse based on mean-CVaR(Conditional Value-at-Risk)is established.The optimal order and recycling price of a retailer with different risk preferences is derived,and the order changes of retailers under different risk preference parameters are analyzed.An optimal buy-back constract and revenue-sharing contract coordination mechanism is proposed,and the supply chain members,operation decisions and performances with the change of system parameters(recycle ratio,constract parameters and risk parameters)are discussed.Thirdly,On the basis of above research,comparing decision-makers profits under the different contracts,the relationship between the two kinds of contracts are analyzed and analyzing the impacts of buy-back contract and revenue-sharing contract on members' profit under realizing the closed-loop supply chain coordination.Finally,numerical calculations are conducted to validate the effectiveness of designed closed-loop supply chain buy-back contract and revenue-sharing contract.The results show that:(1)the buy-back constract and revenue-sharing contract can not only coordinate closed-loop supply chain under the risk neutral condition,but also completely coordinate a closed-loop supply chain with risk-aversion condition and different risk preferences.It's different with risk-neutral situation,the profits of closed-loop supply chain members will be affected by both contract parameters and degree of risk averse under considersing risk-aversion and will be affected by contract parameters and risk parameters and pessimism coefficient under considering risk preferences,respectively.Specially,the designed buy-back constract and revenue-sharing contract coordination mechanism can effectively distribute closed-loop supply chain profits and reduce the deviation between an optimal order strategy and order strategy caused by risk performances;(2)the recycle ratio of retailer will affect the operation performance of closed-loop supply chain system and members,the greater recycle ratio,the greater closed-loop supply chain profits;(3)the members profits under buy-back constract is equal to the corresponding members profits under revenue-sharing contract when buy-back parameters and revenue-sharing coefficients satisfy certain constraints.According to the relationship between contract parameters,the decision makers can choose the optimal contract,but the selection of contract depends on the participants' bargaining power and status in the system.