Knowledge-intensive Service Outsourcing Contract Design Considering The Limited Of Advanced-fund Capacity Of Service Providers

The explosive expansion of knowledge makes knowledge intensive services diverge from the traditional service industry and develop rapidly.The development of information technology has led to fierce competition in knowledge-intensive service industries which based on knowledge.Therefore,in order to obtain external expertise and enhance their competitiveness,enterprises outsource their non-core businesses to service providers.However,because the information between outsourcing enterprises and service providers is asymmetric,service providers will be lazy with their information superiority in order to gain high profit when they provide knowledge-intensive service outsourcing,resulting in service providers' moral hazard.For this reason,most outsourcing enterprises will divide knowledge intensive service outsourcing costs into fixed payment and completion reward after project completion through designing knowledge intensive service outsourcing contract,so as to achieve the purpose of promoting service provider hard work.But the payment contract often require service providers provide advanced-fund.Therefore,outsourcing enterprises need to consider service providers' advanced-fund capacity when designing knowledge-intensive service outsourcing.Because service providers have different attitudes toward risk,different attitudes of service providers to risk may lead to different designs of knowledge-intensive service outsourcing contracts.Therefore,this study first studies the knowledge-intensive service outsourcing contract considering service providers' advanced-fund capacity under the risk-neutral nature of service providers,and construct the knowledge-intensive service outsourcing principal-agent model considering service providers' advanced-fund capacity under the risk-neutral nature of service providers.The paper mainly analyzes the influence of service providers' advanced-fund ability on knowledge-intensive service outsourcing contracts,and optimize and select each parameter in the model,and validate the relevant conclusion through examples.Then this paper study the knowledge-intensive service outsourcing contract considering service providers' advanced-fund capacity under the risk aversion of service providers,and construct the knowledge-intensive service outsourcing principal-agent model considering service providers' advanced-fund capacity under the risk aversion of service providers,and validate the relevant conclusion through examples.The results of the study show that:first,under the risk-neutral of service providers,outsourcing enterprises may outsource knowledge-intensive services to service providers with strong advanced-fund capacity,and outsourcing enterprises do not consider the problem of outsourcing enterprises advanced-fund capacity of service providers in the design of payment contract.Second,under the risk aversion of service providers,outsourcing enterprises do not need to consider the advanced-fund capacity of service providers when the risk aversion of service providers exceeds a certain value.When the risk aversion of service providers is less than a certain value,outsourcing enterprises Will be based on advanced-fund capacity of service providers to choose a different pay contract.This study adds the limitation of service providers' advanced-fund capacity to the research of knowledge-intensive service outsourcing,which not only enriches the theoretical research on preventing service providers' moral hazard in knowledge-intensive service outsourcing,but also helps enterprises choose the optimal payment contract to achieve the goal of maximizing their benefits.