Research On The Tunneling In The Process Of Equity Incentive In Chinese Listed Company

Due to the separation of corporate ownership and control,the principal-agent problem has become the core issue of modern corporate governance.To a certain extent,the emergence of equity incentive has eased the contradiction between ownership and control.However,in china,due to the concentration of ownership of listed companies,the imperfect regulatory mechanism,the phenomenon of information asymmetry and the existence of managers' self-serving opportunistic behavior,equity incentive eventually becomes a tool for managers to seek benefits for themselves.Previous studies mostly focused on the design of equity incentive and its impact on the performance of the company.There are few case studies on the benefits transfer behind the equity incentive.These problems have drawn wide attention.Based on this,this paper studies the problem of interest distribution behind the equity incentive of listed companies,and puts forward policy recommendations in light of China's national conditions so as to achieve the goal of protecting the interests of outside investors and promote the healthy development of capital markets.The main conclusions of this paper:(1)The real motivation of equity incentive will have an impact on the implementation result.There is welfare motivation in the equity incentive of the company.(2)From the design of contractual elements of equity incentive,the disclosure of bad news before the announcement,the accrued earnings management and the transfer of shares after the equity incentive,we can conclude that there is indeed a transfer of interests in equity incentive.(3)The transfer of benefits in equity incentive not only infringes the interests of minority shareholders,but also damages the long-term performance of the company.Therefore,at the end of this article,suggestions are put forward in terms of the design of the equity incentive plan and the internal and external environment,which has certain theoretical and practical significance for improving the corporate governance structure and enhancing the effectiveness of the equity incentive plan design.