Research On Management And Maintenance Of Land Consolidation Project Based On Principal-agent Theory

Land remediation projects have improved agricultural production and rural living conditions,increased food production capacity,and have shown results in practice.However,the long-term“construction of light management and management"ideology has led to problems such as unclear management and protection mechanisms,inadequate management and protection mechanisms,and insecure management and protection funds.This not only prevents the quality of land remediation projects from being effectively guaranteed.It also limits the long-term benefits of land remediation projects.In view of this,it is particularly important to strengthen the theoretical and practical research on the management and protection of land remediation projects in the later period.This article analyzes the different aspects of management and protection,entrusted agency relations,sources of funds,and management and protection effects in the current management and protection model of land remediation through the"Research on the Standardization of Land Renovation Projects" carried out in Henan Province and Jiangxi Province.The special research conducted a comparative study of the principal-agent relationship,the management and protection mechanism,and the funds management and protection methods that existed in different post-management models.The research shows that the three major types of management and protection of land remediation projects can be summarized as follows:administrative entrusted agency model,market transaction entrusted agency model and cooperative management entrusted agency model,among which the collaborative management model is relatively mature.Although the cooperative management model is an idealized management and protection model in the later period,it also has the common problems of principal-agents,such as the overlapping of the main functions of the management and protection,weak supervision and law enforcement forces,and inconsistent objective functions.In order to solve the above-mentioned principal-agent issues effectively,this paper constructs a system of incentive and supervision under the multi-agent principal-agent relationship,and provides a reference for designing a complete set of incentive and supervision mechanisms in order to maximize the utility function of the principal and the agent.