Research On Longitudinal Collusion Behavior And Prevention In Government Investment Projects Of Bidding

The problem of bidding in collusion,to some extent,will have a negative impact on the healthy development of society.Bidding in collusion what the tenderer and the bidder mutual"collusion",have damage to other enterprises and personal interests that in normal procedures way to participate in the bidding.Meanwhile,it also make a great influence on the bidding environment of free competition and the principle of excellent is first.The most important thing is that it cause the government corruption,it is enough to make us imagine the great harm it produces.Especially in the government investment projects,once the bidding problems exist,not only a long cycle,large funds and other hazards will be produced,but also the adverse effects on society will be even greater.This is a big challenge for forming a fair,just and open construction market.Therefore,it is very necessary to study the collusion relationship between government investment projects of bidding.Therefore,this paper based on the view that the owners may be rent-seeking.Firstly,it is on the basis of understanding the longitudinal collusion behavior in government investment projects of bidding,and considering with the phenomenon of collusion in the bidding mode,then using the related knowledge of game theory and information economics to analyzes these three collusion subjects,which include the owners of the representatives,the tender agency and the bidder.Secondly,on this basis,the relevant concepts and assumptions of the model can be analyzed.Finally,from these three collusion subjects,compared the expected benefits of the side to participate in the collusion with the side do not,and eventually constructs the longitudinal collusion game model in government investment projects of bidding.The conclusion is that the prospective benefits of the collusion is not only related to the normal benefits,but also related with the illegal benefits to obtain in the collusion,the probability by the relevant government departments found,the penalty coefficient of the owners of the representatives will be faced when it is found and the opportunity cost.Finally,through the questionnaire survey,we will strengthen the supervision,increase the punishment,increase the incentive,reinforce the reputation mechanism and others(including the electronic tendering,the qualification after the trial,etc.)to carry out the validity test of measures,in order to prevent the formation of longitudinal collusion in government investment projects of bidding.And then from these five aspects,we can make preventive recommendations and measures.It provides a qualitative method for the analysis of government investment project bidding and collocation,which makes it easier for government departments to supervise the fairness and justice of bidding market,and provide a theoretical basis for improving the further bidding market.