Research On Agency Problems Of Lost Control Right Of The Founder

With the continuous enhancement of China's market vitality,many enterprises have introduced outside investors,hoping to achieve a win-win situation.However,the founders and investors of the enterprise,based on their different standpoints and interests,have opposite opinions on the operation and decision-making of the enterprise,which can lead to a series of agency problems.Based on the idea of finding,analyzing and of solving problems,this paper studies the agency problems of lost control right of the founder and extends the research content of control right and agency problems of the founder.In this article,the control of the enterprise by the founder is divided into two parts;Firstly,the founder holds the shares of the enterprise,and whether the founder is the largest shareholder of the enterprise;Secondly,the management right of the enterprise takes the management position of the founder as the measurement standard.The severity of the agency problem is reflected in the financial standing,the representation costs and the market reaction of the enterprise.Therefore,this paper measures the agency problems in these three ways.The first part of the article is the introduction,which introduces theresearch background,research significance,research content and methods,innovation and literature review.The second part discusses theory analysis model and constructs two theoretical models: a quadrant diagram of theoretical analysis of lost control right of the founder and a model diagram of theoretical coping mechanism of the founder in the face of competition for control right.The third part illustrates the case taking LEISHI Lighting holdings Co.Ltd.(hereinafter referred to as "LEISHI Lighting”)and Zhejiang SUPOR Co.Ltd(hereinafter referred to as the“SUPOR”)two companies as examples with the method of case study.It analyzes agency problems occurring in the process of losing control right of the founder after external investors' involvement.First of all,after sorting out the loss of control right of the founders in LEISHI Lighting and SUPOR,the author illustrates the evolution path graph of management right and equity of founders in the two enterprises.Secondly,this paper analyzes the causes and problems of the two cases.The fourth part is case analysis,analyzing the agency problems reflected in the competition of control right and analyzing the financial ratio from profitability,solvency,operation ability and growth ability.The author analyzes agency cost from management fee rate and asset turnover ratio,and analyzes the agency costs reflected in the stock price by event study approach.In the fifth part,the author summarizes lost control right of the founder in the two cases and believes that the founder's loss of largestshareholder does not necessarily lead to serious agency problems.The founder has more obvious influence on agency problems and enterprise management.Finally,the author puts forward relevant suggestions for founders,investors,management and minority shareholders.