| From the 1990s to the beginning of this century,share pledge has attracted a lot of attention from the media and investors in some regions of the world.In recent years,as an emerging financing method in China,share pledge has been favored by shareholders in listed companies.Especially after 2013,the business of share pledge was allowed to be undertaken by securities companies,and then the domestic market size of share pledge increased tremendously.On the one hand,as an efficient and convenient financing method,share pledge could ease the tight cash flow situation of some companies.On the other hand,the current market is immature and laws and regulations of share pledge are not complete,therefore extensive share pledge has brought high risk to capital market.Since 2017,many accounts of share pledge in listed companies has wiped out,which sounded the alarm for market.How to identify the motivation of share pledge accurately and judge the development of corporate performance after pledge effectively has become major issues,which investors,pledgees and capital market regulators have to face.First of all,this article sorted out relevant research of founders and share pledge,and found that existing results have insufficient exploration of deep reasons in share pledge motivation.Then this article invoked psychological ownership and principal-agent theory to establish a logical relationship between founder-control and share pledge strategy.Next,this article carried out a comparison of share pledge strategy between Silan and Gosun company.Then this article explored different share pledge motivations in these companies and the deep impact of founder-control on share pledge motivations,and analyzed alignment and entrenchment effect after share pledge.Finally,this article drew following conclusions:(1)the characteristic of founder-control in private enterprises has an important impact on share pledge strategy.Founder-controllers are affected by psychological ownership and specific assets,and they tend to make the proportion and frequency of share pledge within a reasonable range and invest the pledge funds in their listed companies Non-founder-controllers are susceptible to the potential domination of principal-agent and private benefits.Therefore,they are more enthusiastic about pledging their shares frequently with a high proportion,and they also invest funds in themselves and their affiliates in order to acquire private benefits of control.(2)From the proportion of share pledge,a high proportion of share pledge is more likely to aggravate the encroachment effect of listed companies' shareholders and has a negative impact on corporate performance.(3)From the application of funds raised by share pledge,the investment of funds in actual controllers and holding stockholders has a negative impact on corporate performance,while the investment in listed companies and their subsidiaries is the opposite.In view of this,this paper suggested that private listed companies could limit the proportion of single shareholder's share pledge and their voting right after share pledge,and subdivide supervisory authority so as to form special supervision,which could reduce the risk of encroachment on listed companies'interests;investors should concern about founder-control deeply and follow market dynamics closely,and identify the risk of investment targets in a timely manner;capital market supervision department should emphasize the completeness and timeliness of share pledge information's disclosure and increase the punishment for illegal behavior in order to form a high-pressure situation,and strive to reduce the possibility of obtaining private benefits by actual controllers. |
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