Research On The Influence Of Executive Stock Ownership On Corporate Performance In China's Private Listed Companies

Since the reform and opening up,China's economy has always maintained sound and rapid development.Market economy reforms have continued to deepen and remarkable achievements have been made.The market economy system of our country started late compared with Western capitalist countries,resulting in the operation of the Xu mechanism.Among them,how to effectively motivate senior executives through the equity allocation system has always been an important issue that Chinese companies have tried hard to explore but have not yet resolved.The effectiveness of senior management holdings has always been the focus of domestic and foreign scholars.However,from the literature review,the academic community has not reached a consensus on the relationship between executive ownership and corporate performance,and there are few The study explores the issue of senior management holdings in private enterprises.The private enterprises in our country are faced with many tests on the way to the international market.In the domestic market,they face the share of state-owned enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises.Exploring ways that can help Chinese private enterprises effectively improve their performance will help China's private enterprises out of the predicament.Among them,executive holdings as an incentive that can have a significant impact on corporate performance are worth exploring in depth.To better understand the relationship between executive ownership and industry performance,this article draws lessons from principal-agent theory and equity incentive theory,and believes that giving a certain percentage of senior management shares can not only fully mobilize the enthusiasm of senior executives,and enhance their The efficiency of work can also greatly reduce the company's commissioning agency costs and reduce the internal regulatory risks arising from information asymmetry,unifying the interests appeals of the principal and the agent,thereby maximizing the performance of the company.Through theoretical deductions,the research hypothesis of this paper is proposed,that is,the relationship between executive ownership and private enterprise performance is linearly positive(H1),irrelevant(H2),private enterprise scale is posit ively related to corporate performance(H3),and the total assets of private enterprises are turned around.The rate is positively correlated with corporate performance(H4).A sample of 1565 consecutive financial years of 313 private listed companies of the A-share main board from 2012 to 2016 was selected as research data.SPSS was used to conduct empirical analysis based on multiple regression.In the empirical analysis,the sample data was taken according to whether the executives held shares.The descriptive statistics of the samples were divided into two categories,and the two sets of statistical data were compared and analyzed to explore whether the performance of private enterprises in China would be affected by the incentives of the senior management.The results show that the relationship between executive ownership and corporate performance is not a simple linear correlation,but presents an inverted U-non-linear correlation,that is,corporate performance in the increasing proportion of senior ma nagement shareholding Gradually rise to the extreme and then continue to decline(H2).The conclusions of the study indicate that executive ownership can improve the performance of a company to some extent,but it is also necessary to conduct a comprehensi ve analysis and consideration based on the macro background and the industries in which private listed companies are located,and finally determine the proportion of equity incentives.Through the results of empirical analysis,it can also be observed that China's equity incentive system is still in a state where many systems have not yet been completed due to the late start.Finally,based on the research conclusions,this article elaborates on what measures China should take in the future to improve the e ffective operation of equity incentive policies from the rational use of incentive policies,the establishment of an effective internal restraint mechanism,the establishment of an effective capital market,and the improvement of laws and regulations.