Research On The Relationship Between Executive Compensation And Corporate Performance Of Listed Companies

The concept of executive compensation has not been put forward in the first place and the performance of the company has not much connection,with the separation of own,ership and management rights and the development of market economy,principal-agent has become the mainstream,in order to reduce agency costs,improve the level of company performance,in the game between the company owner and the operator,determine the effective executive compensation incentive mechanism as the core constraint incentive mechanism is particularly important,it can not only well coordinate the owner and the operator due to the pursuit of inconsistent goals and contradictions,reduce due to information asymmetry and other damage to the owner and the company's long-term interests and development,reduce agency costs,can also effectively safeguard the interests of the operator,incentive operators in efforts to achieve company performance At present,listed companies play an important role in China's total economy and economic development.it is of great significance to study the internal relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance in order to improve the performance of listed companies and promote the transformation and upgrading of China's economy.On the basis of summarizing the relevant literature and theories at home and abroad,this paper theoretically clarifies the relevant concepts and analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance.This paper makes statistical analysis on the characteristics of executive compensation of listed companies in China from,the aspects of overall characteristics,property right characteristics and industry characteristics,and sums up and analyzes the present situation,existing problems and causes of executive compensation of listed companies in China;Through theoretical analysis,the corresponding research hypothesis is put forward.Taking company performance as dependent variable,using principal component analysis method,12 indicators were selected from four dimensions of profitability,debt paying,management and development to measure company performance.taking executive monetary compensation and executive shareholding ratio as independent variables,the regression model was established by taking company size,ownership concentration ratio,independent director ratio,executive size and property rights as control variables.This paper selects the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as the research sample,and carries out empirical regression analysis on the data from 2012 to 2016.in order to test the effect of control variables on executive compensation on corporate performance,this paper adds interactive items to verify.The results show that the incentive effect of executive compensation in state-owned companies is significantly higher than that in non-state-owned companies.executive monetary compensation and the proportion of executive stock ownership have a positive impact on the performance of the company.factors such as ownership concentration and the scale of executive stock ownership have a positive impact on the performance of the company.From adjusting the executive compensation structure,improving the corporate governance mechanism,improving the transparency of executive compensation disclosure,and improving relevant laws and regulations,this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions on improving the executive compensation mechanism and improving the performance of listed companies.