Research On Coordination Of Revenue-sharing Contract With Fairness Preference In Supply Chain

Because of Supply chain "horizontal integration",supply chain coordination became the focus of supply chain management research.The revenue-sharing contract attracts attention,because of its importance in the supply chain coordination.The "people" in the standard revenue-sharing contract theory is completely rational and selfish "Economic man",but the "people" in reality is often "bounded rational".Bounded rationality is manifested in many social preferences.social preferences may make the decision of supply chain contract in practical application deviate from the conclusion of traditional normative theory.On account of the above problem,Research of this paper will be introduce fairness preference that is one of the most common social preferences into the standard supply chain revenue-sharing contract.The main contents and methods are as follows:First,we use the Nash bargaining solution as fair benchmark to establish the utility function model of revenue-sharing contract that both suppliers and retailers consider fair preferences.And the analysis method of Stackelberg game is used to solve the utility model.The research shows that the existence of fair preference increases the difficulty that the revenue-sharing contract coordinate the supply chain,without affecting the coordination Parameter value of the revenue sharing contract.Second,In the supply chain that have a supplier and multiple retailers,retailers need to consider both vertical and horizontal fairness preferences in the revenue-sharing contract model.In this paper,the Nash bargaining solution is used as the benchmark of vertical fairness preference,and the actual profit average of retailers is used as the benchmark of horizontal fairness preference.The results show that the retailer's vertical and horizontal fairness preference have the opposite effect on the retailer's order quantity under the same parameter condition,but the retailer's vertical fair preference has a greater influence.So by adjusting the contract parameters can improve the enthusiasm of retailers.Thus the results can provide management implications for supply chain managers.Finally,the paper takes a supply chain of seasonal product as an example to validate the theoretical derivation.The innovation of this paper: first,use the Nash bargaining solution as fair benchmark to establish the utility function model of revenue-sharing contract that both suppliers and retailers consider fair preferences;Second,the supply chain structure is extended to the one supplier and multiple retailers,and increase horizontal fairness preference.This study enriches the relevant research contents,which has certainly theoretical and practical significance.