The Study Of The Incentive Mechanism Of Commercial Bank To B2B Platform In Online Supply Chain Finance

With the development of economy and information technology,the online supply chain finance?OSCF?generated by the combination of the traditional supply chain finance?SCF?and the Internet is gradually becoming the future development trend.The bank commissions B2B platform for credit review in the OSCF by the information resources of the B2B platform and professional data analysis technology.There are typical principal-agent problems between the bank and B2B platform.Given relevant Internet finance laws and regulations still incomplete,it is particularly meaningful to study how the commercial bank design incentive mechanism to protect their own interests.The research of OSCF is still a new field.Now,the research lays emphasis on the models,risk analysis of financing enterprises,etc.,the research of principal-agent problems between the bank and B2B is lack.Based on the existing literature,this paper focuses on the quantitative research about incentive mechanism between bank and B2B platform,adopting principal-agent theory and incentive mechanism.The main contents and result are as follows.Firstly,we analyzes the moral hazard about hidden information and hidde action of B2B platform in credit review with the retailer's electronic order financing in this paper.For the moral hazard of hidden action,when there is a single-phase principal-agent relationship between the bank and B2B platform,we target to introduce the bank's credit line and loan interest rate variables,and construct the static incentive model in accordance with the specific conditions;Then,considering the importance of the information data of B2B platform which the bank attachs,we introduce a static incentive models with the observable information variables.Finally,considering the characteristics of long-term partnership in OSCF and multiple principal-agent relationship between the bank and B2B platform,we construct a dynamic incentive model considering the reputation effects of B2B platform,explore the condition for achieving effective reputation incentive.And solve and contrast the B2B platform's effort level,bank's incentive coefficient and expected return.And prove the rationality of relevant conclusion by numerical simulations with MATLAB.The research shows that:In single-phase principal-agent relationship,with the introduction of observable information variables,the effort level of the B2B platform and the incentive coefficient of the bank increase,and when the degree of information sharing increases,he expected return of the bank increases;In the multi-principal-agent relationship,when the bargaining power of the B2B platform is greater than the bank's incentive coefficient k>?₂,The effective incentive of reputation can be achieved;Meanwhile,after considering the reputation effect,the effort level of the B2B platform increases,the bank's incentive coefficient has an increasing trend,and the expected return increases.