| Innovation is the inexhaustible motive force for economic and social development and the only way to achieve economic restructuring and industrial upgrading.After China's economy has entered the new normal,improving its ability to innovate has become one of the key entry points for resolving the current economic difficulties.The evaluation of innovation indicators in promotion will cause local officials to attach great importance to innovation and may cause local governments to set off a new round of competition in the field of innovation.This paper constructs an R&D championship effect game model to explain the game of local officials in innovation competition and further explore the impact of innovation competition on economic efficiency.The relevant research conducted by officials in the promotion championships believes that officials in various localities are pursuing high economic growth rates in order to obtain opportunities for advancement.After entering the new normal,the Chinese economy needs to be transformed,with a greater emphasis on the quality of economic growth rather than rapid growth.Innovation is an important indicator of the quality of a region's economy.Local governments generally use patents to measure innovation levels,but can the increase in the amount of patents improve economic efficiency?Based on the above analysis and model derivation,this paper puts forward two hypotheses:(1)In the official R&D evaluation system,when the spillover effect of innovation input is less than the local effect,officials will actively increase innovation input and improve innovation output;(2)The total effect of innovation output is positive,and the economic efficiency of the region under the effect of R&D championships will increase;conversely,the regional economic efficiency under the effect of R&D championships will decrease.In the empirical test part,according to the analysis of the theoretical model part,this paper establishes two econometric models to examine the effect of R&D championship effect and R&D championship effect on economic efficiency.The conclusions are as follows:(1)From the municipal level,it is proved that the official R&D championship effect does exist,and the existence of the GDP promotion championship is verified;(2)The existence of the R&D championship effect does not significantly improve the regional economic efficiency.This shows that if only the amount of patents as an indicator of official innovation assessment may not be appropriate,it may be too valued that patents may artificially interfere with the innovation process by officials,but may impede the development of innovation;(3)The existence of spatial spillover effects of innovation output.Suppression of officials' efforts to increase innovation output,but officials will still work hard to increase local innovation output under the R&D championship effect,verifying that the existence of the first hypothesis of the R&D championship effect in this article will motivate local officials to interfere in corporate innovation activities.To make strategic innovations in order to obtain government subsidies and tax incentives.The end result is that companies are more inclined to cater to the government rather than focus on substantive innovation;(4)The deterioration of environmental pollution has no significant impact on the promotion of officials,but it has a significant negative impact on economic efficiency.The deterioration of the environment may represent an expansion of the economy in the short term,but it is unfavorable to the long-term healthy and sustainable development of the economy and the improvement of economic efficiency;(5)There is a negative impact on the green TFP,may indicate that the R&D championship effect has no economic efficiency.At the same time as the obvious increase,excessive consumption of resources and deterioration of the environment may have played an accelerating role,and the extensive economic model that depends on factor input may still not have been fundamentally changed. |
PDF Full Text Request