Research On The Influence Of Managerial Discretion On Enterprise's Technological Innovation

Under the background of innovation-driven innovation,if an enterprise wants to be in a competitive position and improve its core competitiveness,it must actively carry out technological innovation activities to maximally promote the transformation of technological innovation output.Technological innovation can be divided into development-based innovation and exploration.The risks and payback periods of innovation,exploration and innovation are all higher than the development innovation.The principal-agent theory believes that due to the asymmetry of market information and the incompletion of contracts,when companies invest in technological innovation,there are inconsistent interest objectives between shareholders and managers,leading to managerial opportunistic behavior and influencing technological innovation investment.Managers' certain autonomy will inspire their innovation potential and managerial ability,and strengthen managers' motivation for technological innovation.Therefore,how the size of managerial autonomy affects the technological innovation of enterprises is worth exploring.On the basis of literature review,with the help of principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,and taking into account the fact that there are strong technical innovation inputs and low-quality commonalities in the transformation of output achievements in manufacturing companies,the study of manufacturing managerial autonomy has been conducted.The influence of power on technological innovation has strong practical significance.The2010-2015 data of the A-share manufacturing listed companies in China's Shenzhen City was selected as a research sample.SPSS19.0,STATA 12.1 and other statistical analysis software were used to synthesize managers' synthesis from four different dimensions of managerial autonomy and using principal component analysis.The power index carries out theoretical analysis and empirical research on the relationship between managerial autonomy and corporate technological innovation output,as well as the different influence of managerial autonomy on development and exploration innovation.The main conclusions are as follows: The greater the managerial autonomy of the manager,the more beneficial to the enterprise's technological innovation output;the greater the managerial autonomy of the manager,the more conducive to the development of innovative activities and the less conducive to the exploration of innovative activities;The greater the position authority in managerial autonomy and the longer the general manager's tenure,the more conducive to the development of innovative activities.When the manager's position is greater,the more it is not conducive to the exploration of innovative activities,and the general manager The longer the time,the less conducive to the exploration of innovativeactivities;according to the size of the manager's comprehensive autonomy,the nature of the ultimate controller,and the general manager's tenure test results,this correlation effect exists in different internal and external governance environments..It shows that managers have risk aversion in technological innovation activities,which proves that under the principal-agent relationship,managers' short-term performance pressures generate short-term behavior.