Research On The Management Risk Prevention Of Occupational Annuity Fund Of Shanghai Government Agencies And Institutions From The Perspective Of Entrusted-agent

As one of the supplementary endowment insurance in our country's endowment insurance system,occupational annuity is an important system in social security.The management of occupational pension fund is related to the pension benefits of retirees in government institutions,so it is of great significance to conduct in-depth research on the management risk of occupational pension fund.At present,China's occupational annuity fund management system stipulates that government agencies,public institutions and their staff need to entrust annuity fund assets to the social insurance agency,which constitutes the first layer of principal-agent relationship.The social insurance agency acts as the agent to sign the entrusted management contract of the occupational annuity plan with the trustee,and the trustee signs the entrusted management contract of the occupational annuity plan with the trustee and the investment manager respectively.They are specifically responsible for the operation of the enterprise annuity fund,which constitutes the second layer of the principal-agent relationship.In the two-layer multi-agent relationship,there must be principal-agent risk,which is embodied in adverse selection and moral hazard.This article attempts from the existing rules and regulations and the present situation of occupational pension,clarify each party the benefit relationship between the main body in occupational pension,according to the principal-agent theory,the analysis of the Shanghai professional agencies and institutions exist in the pension fund the operation of the principal-agent risk,find the reasons for the risks.Finally,based on the experience of MPF management in Hong Kong,this paper puts forward the countermeasures of occupational pension fund management risk prevention from two aspects: design of incentive mechanism,supervision and restraint mechanism.