Study Of Risk Management And Pricing Of Deposit Insurance System

As a creative and advanced financial system, deposit insurance is a double-edged sword, namely that when implemented properly, DIS will help make the finance system stable, otherwise the institutional risk may limit the function of DIS and even destroy the financial stability.This dissertation can be divided into three parts as following:Focusing on institutional risk control, this dissertation demonstrated the effect of institutional risk on DIS' objects by analyzing the relationship between deposit insurance and financial development, financial stability and market discipline, in light of foreign or native primary theory and empirical results of DIS.In virtue of statistical method and with the theory of game, this dissertation explored the cause the institutional risk such as moral risk and adverse selection, on the basis of which discussed the approach of controlling institutional risk and proper deposit insurance pattern.Because deposit insurance assessment is the core of institutional risk control, this dissertation introduced and discussed deeply the Passive Casualty-Insurance Model, the option-pricing model, the Game-theory-based pricing model, and reasonable pricing interval, and put forward the hierarchical pricing strategy of DIS on the balance of information confiscatory and risk-based-assessment necessity.At the same time, the dissertation argued that it is not right time for china to construct and implement DIS, own to institutional risk and lack of ability of risk control in china.