Decision-making And Coordination In Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain Considering Market Structure

With the increasing awareness of environmental protection by consumers,green products are increasingly favored by the public.The rapid development of e-commerce has increased the channels through which consumers contact and purchase green products.This paper considers consumers' perceptions of product greenness across different channels,and also considers the difference between online and offline channel pricing,and constructs a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model,a retailer-led Stackelberg game model,and Nash game model.The three models use the game theory method to obtain equilibrium solutions and compare them with the single channel decisions,and Two-part Tariff and Revenue Sharing Contract are used to coordinate the supply chain.The findings are as follows:In the comparative study of different power structures,when the cost of green R&D is high,both manufacturers and retailers have the incentive to compete as channel leaders.However,for the entire supply chain,Nash's decision-making can improve product greening and the profit of the entire supply chain.When the cost of green R&D is relatively low,the profits of manufacturers are higher under the tilted supply chain structure,and vertical Nash decision making is a strict measure.For the comparison between dual-channel and single-channel,the product greenness and the profit of the manufacturer are higher than the single channel under the dual-channel structure.The comparison of the retailer's profit in the dual-channel and single-channel depends on the cost of green research and development.When green R&D costs are low and consumers' preference for offline channels is higher,opening online channels will increase retailers' profits.Conversely,when R&D costs are high and consumers' preferences for offline channels are weakened,opening the online channels will reduce the retailer's profits and create double-channel conflicts.Two-part Tariff and Revenue Sharing Contract can coordinate channel conflicts in the dual-channel supply chain.There is a range of compensation costs and income distribution ratios for the supply and sales parties.The specific value depends on the bargaining power of both parties.