Research On Financing And Operation Decision Of Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

With the rapid development of social economy,the level of science and technology is continuously improving,and the support of national policies has been vigorously encouraged to encourage innovation and entrepreneurship.Nowadays,more and more SMEs in our country have occupied a large proportion.At the same time,the market competition in all walks of life tends to be intensifying.Many companies are increasing their capital investment and expanding their market share.Funds for small and medium-sized enterprises are basically insufficient.The problem of insufficient funds will be particularly acute at this time.Especially in the era of advocating new retail,retail companies are facing greater reform pressure.In the process of advancing development,the existing funds of many small and medium-sized retail enterprises cannot support their normal operations,and thus affect the operation of their supply chains.However,enterprises' loans to banks are an important way to obtain financing from outside,and they are the first choice for obtaining financing support.They are also the main research methods for financing.In the actual transaction of bank-enterprise financing,there are mainly the following problems: First,the degree of mastery of information between financing parties is different,and there is information asymmetry.Loan companies are on the market side and have a clearer picture of the market's realities.Compared with commercial banks,there are obvious advantages in information.However,companies only consider their own profits.When making decisions,they will conceal or report real market information falsely.This is typical.The problem of adverse selection,and information asymmetry will increase the risk of bank default,which will affect the two sides of the transaction.Second,the demand for products sold by enterprises in the market fluctuates greatly.In the Internet era,consumers are exposed to new things every day.Accordingly,their needs have become customized and diversified.Their buying behaviors have become more rational and mature,and they have become more sensitive to prices.As a result,market demand has fluctuated.In addition,the industry environment is also changing,and more and more uncertain factors will lead to great risks for the company's operations.The increased risk means that the possibility of losses will increase.Third,before banks lend to enterprises,they will carry out preliminary audits,assessments,etc.In the face of many uncertainties,banks exhibit risk-avoidance features and tend to adopt more conservative actions,it has a certain degree of impact on both the self and the company's revenue.Therefore,how banks design contracts for effective information screening and understanding of information and asymmetric banking and corporate decision-making are conducive to ensuring the effective operation of financing in the supply chain,which in turn helps to ease corporate financial difficulties.Information screening,as an incentive and coordination method,is an effective way to solve the problem of information asymmetry.In order to study and improve the above problems,this paper uses the discrimination model to study bank-enterprise financing under asymmetric information,and considers the impact of different bank risk attitudes on financing and operational decisions.The specific research content of this paper is as follows:First,based on the actual operation of A company,the sales status of its product,the desktop 3D printer,and the financing problems faced by the company are analyzed.Then,based on the problems existing in A company,a supply chain consisting of under-funded retailers and banks with different risk attitudes was established.Among them,the market demand of retailers was affected not only by product prices but also by some uncertainties.There is information asymmetry between the two,assuming that the asymmetry information is price-sensitive,researching the problem of financing decision-making in the supply chain where the lack of funds for the retailer to obtain the optimal order quantity from the supplier and loan from the bank.Starting from different information structures(symmetric information,adverse selection),banks provide retailers with a set of contract menus consisting of interest rates and transfer payments,and construct corresponding identification models to derive optimal financing decisions and retailer ordering decisions.The influence of price-sensitive factors and risk aversion coefficients on the decisions and profits of banks and retailers was discussed.Secondly,taking into account the bank's risk attitudes,it compares and analyzes the changes in banks' risk aversion and risk-neutral changes in their respective interests.Finally,it connects the actual conditions of A companies and puts forward suggestions for reference.The study found that when there are adverse selections between trading parties,the adoption of screening contracts can well inspire retailers to reveal the actual market conditions,and that banks have the greatest expected utility under the contract,but banks' treatment of risk circumvention will weaken the company's enthusiasm for loans,companies are more likely to make loans to risk-neutral banks and reduce the cost of loans.The loan program selected by the company in the bank is influenced by the price sensitivity level in the market,and when there is adverse selection,the company's loan interest rate and transfer payment are higher.The expected profit of low-responsive retailers is affected not only by the sensitivity of price demand but also by the market share of the type.Under certain conditions,choosing a screening contract will result in additional benefits.