Research On The Coordination Of Supply Chain Rebate And Punishment Contract Considering Risk Attitude

Modern enterprise market environment in the face of economic globalization and the rapid development of high and new technology,compared with the traditional enterprise,the unprecedented change,traditional enterprise competition for the enterprise and the competition between the enterprises,the modern enterprise competition has turned to the competition between supply chain composed of a number of enterprises.In the face of the uncertainty of market demand and market supply increases,many policymakers to consider risk attitude of the supply chain to the supply chain coordination management,they hope to achieve a balance between expectation returns and risk loss.Therefore,it is a new research direction to consider the risk attitude of supply chain participants.This paper mainly studies the coordination of supply chain rebate and penalty contract under the condition of double supply and demand uncertainty.Aiming at the secondary supply chain system with risk aversion attitude,a game model of Stackelberg is established,which consists of a supplier and a retailer.First of all,the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision making is risk neutral supply chain both cases analysis,proved unable to achieve coordination of supply chain under wholesale price contract,to verify the effectiveness of the rebate and penalty contract.Secondly,it compares and analyzes the expected return of risk-averse supply chain under centralized decision making and the expected return of risk-neutral supply chain under centralized decision making.Finally consider the supply chain under decentralized decision making participants different risk aversion attitude,using the theory of conditional value at risk(CVaR)to investigate the different degree of risk aversion of retailers and suppliers in the rebate and penalty contract parameters not can achieve supply chain coordination problems at the same time,and based on two different incentive and punishment of contract compared to find the optimal solution of supply chain coordination.Aiming at the two coordination problems of the supply chain,this paperconsiders different rebate and penalty intensity,and combines the rebate and penalty contract with the risk measurement criterion CVaR.In addition,the uncertainty of market demand is not only taken into account,but also the uncertainty of suppliers' supply.Therefore,the problems studied in this paper have the characteristics of double uncertainty.The results show that the parameters in different rebate and penalty contract as the prerequisite,a risk neutral supply chain retailers and suppliers of both sides and with risk measurement criteria in rebate and penalty under the contract are to the overall coordination of the supply chain,but must meet certain parameters constraints,with the rebate of risk measurement standards and punishment should be more can be accepted by both sides of supply chain contract.