The Impact Of Resignation Of Board Secretary On The Accuracy Of Securities Analysts' Forecasts

In 2006,the company law granted the secretary of the board of directors the legal status of the executives of listed companies.In 2012,the stock exchange regulations of Shanghai and shenzhen stock markets clarified the responsibilities of the board of directors for information disclosure and relationship manHorizonment with all parties in the capital market.The board secretary has received attention from the capital markets and academia.As an important source of information for analysts,the secretary of the board of directors holds a large number of important information about the production and operation and capital operation of listed companies.In order to improve the prediction accuracy and increase the value of research report,securities analysts have enough motivation to establish a good personal relationship with the secretary of the board of directors to obtain private information.However,due to the imperfect construction of China's capital market,the replacement of the secretary of the board of directors is more frequent.The frequent replacement of the secretary has an impact on the information disclosure in the capital market,and reduces the content of the special information of listed companies in the capital market.The frequent departures of the secretary of the board of directors also affect the accuracy of analysts' research and judgment,because securities analysts rely heavily on the company's idiosyncratic information to judge the investment trend of listed companies and to communicate with investors in the capital market.Therefore,the research on the influence of board secretary turnover on analysts' prediction has certain theoretical and practical significance.In terms of the structure of the paper,this paper firstly reviews the domestic and foreign literatures related to analyst prediction accuracy,secretary of the board of directors and information disclosure of listed companies.This paper illustrates the significance and feasibility of this study from the perspective of literature research.Secondly,this paper takes the earnings forecast in the research report of securities analysts of Shanghai and shenzhen a-share listed companies from 2014 to 2017 and the replacement of the secretary of the board of directors as sample data.Based on the panel data solid effect model,this paper makes an empirical study on whether the change of secretary of the board of directors affects the accuracy of earnings forecast of securities analysts from the perspective of individual continuous prediction of analysts.Based on the relative prediction accuracy and the quality of information disclosure published by stock exchanges,this paper studies the influence of the change of directors on analysts at different levels and in different environments.This paper also takes the stock price synchronization as the proxy variable of the private information of listed companies in the capital market to test the mediating effect of the trait information of listed companies on the accuracy of analysts' prediction on the dimission of the secretary of the board of directors.Finally,the paper comes to the following conclusions:(1)the replacement of the secretary of the board of directors significantly affects the performance of the securities analyst on the accuracy of the target company's earnings forecast.In a year of board secretary turnover,analysts' overall forecast accuracy declines.(2)the influence of secretary replacement on analysts at different forecasting levels is different.The influence of the board secretary change on the analysts with higher accuracy of earnings forecast is greater than that of the listed companies with lower accuracy.(3)under different information environments,there are differences in the influence of secretary replacement on analysts' prediction.Under the condition of low information disclosure quality,the replacement of secretary to the President has a greater impact on analysts with different prediction levels.(4)the private information of the listed company has some mediating effect on the accuracy of the analyst's prediction on the dimission of the secretary of the board of directors.Finally,this paper proposes to establish a long-term mechanism to improve the level of information disclosure of listed companies,regulate the behavior of secretary and analyst of the board of directors,and improve the professional level of secretary and analyst of the board of directors.