Project Incentive Mechanism In PPP Mode

PPP is a medium for long-term cooperation between the private sector and the public sector.When implementing the municipal construction and public welfare projects through the PPP model,the public sector can adjust the personnel,cash flow and technical reserves of the private sector when providing public goods to the society.The private sector can also participate in the operation and management of the project with SPV as a profitable channel.As a comprehensive reform measure,PPP carries the multiple tasks of promoting supply-side structural reform,implementing the goal of “distributing the service”,and promoting the quality and efficiency of public services.As of September 30,2017,the PPP management database publicly listed on the official website of the Ministry of Finance has a total of 6,778 national warehousing projects with an investment of 10.12 trillion yuan;the PPP reserve has a total of 7442 national warehousing projects with an investment of 7.66 trillion yuan.The overall project landing rate was 47.67%.According to this,the investment scale of China's PPP projects is huge,and the number of projects using the PPP model is quite large,but the project has already reached less than half of the land.With the gradual advancement of PPP projects that have not been put into storage,the PPP model has become increasingly effective in stimulating market vitality and promoting public service quality and efficiency.In the project under the PPP mode,how to improve the incentive mechanism design scheme of the project under the PPP mode is one of the difficulties faced in the actual operation of the PPP project.Therefore,based on the research logic of “discovering problems,investigating and analyzing problems,and solving problems”,this paper attempts to analyze the actual project cases,draw on the theory of principal-agent theory,the theory of project governance theory and the research experience of predecessors,in the PPP mode.The research on project incentive mechanism has made some achievements.Through the collation and comparative analysis of relevant researches at home and abroad,it is found that most of the researches are based on principal-agent theory.Other researchers have tried to jump out of the principal-agent analysis framework and look for other theories to study the incentive mechanism of PPP projects.The related research on project governance theory is more comprehensive.At the same time,principal-agent theory and project governance theory as different theories involving incentive mechanism research,principal-agent theory theory has formed a relatively mature enterprise problem analysis model.The key component of the analysis model is an effective agent incentive mechanism.The incentive mechanism improves the agency efficiency of the agent,so as to achieve the purpose of improving the overall efficiency of the enterprise;the project governance theory can complement the principal-agent theory in the design of the actual project incentive mechanism under the PPP mode.The research of principal-agent theory comes from the management rights and ownership of the common corporate system,and the relationship between “client” and “agent” is inconsistent with interest and information asymmetry.The information acquisition channels of principals and agents are unfair,and the asymmetric information acquisition is the root cause of adverse selection problems and moral hazard problems.In the life cycle of the project under the PPP model,the interests between the principal(government department)and the agent(investor)are opposite.How to reduce the conflicts of interest of all parties in the PPP mode and improve the overall efficiency of the project is the research scope of project management theory and project governance theory.The project governance theory can extend the relevant design of the scheme that uses the rigid incentive mechanism and the flexible incentive mechanism to solve the PPP project benefit distribution problem.Based on this,this paper attempts to comprehensively study the incentive mechanism of the above two theories by means of MK company PPP project,and draws the following conclusions:(1)The incentive mechanism based on principal-agent theory can solve the information asymmetry problem of PPP projects.(2)The incentive mechanism based on project governance theory can solve the problem of PPP project benefit distribution.(3)The principal mechanism theory and project governance theory can be comprehensively used to improve the design of incentive mechanism,and the post-evaluation mechanism of the project is continuously improved and strengthened.The research innovation of this paper is reflected in the innovation of research perspective.There are not many results of research and analysis based on the perspective of project governance theory.The results of empirical research based on actual cases are even rarer.The principal-agent theory is the theoretical basis for the conclusion and execution relationship between the principal and the agent.The connotation incentive mechanism only has external characteristics and has certain limitations.For the PPP project,the project itself has a rigid internal organizational structure and a flexible community built by contract,and there are also loose external stakeholders.The project governance theory proposes a rigid incentive mechanism and a flexible incentive mechanism.The internality,dynamics and flexibility represented by the flexible incentive mechanism are not available in the principal-agent theory.This paper believes that the principal-agent theory and project governance theory can be combined in practice,and the combination of principal-agent theory,project governance theory and actual cases to study the project incentive mechanism under PPP mode has certain exploratory characteristics and distinctive features.