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Study On Incentive Mechanism Of Food Quality And Safety Traceable In Formation Transmission

Posted on:2019-08-25Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X J GuanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330572961886Subject:Applied Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,food quality and safety problems appear frequency increasing,this will not only a serious threat to the health of consumer,also cause the collapse of food enterprise reputation,cause huge economic losses and harmful to the society is very large.More and more people including the government,industry associations,consumers and other sectors of the society are highly concerned.In 2017 the state council issued the "much starker choices-and graver consequences-in" national food safety plan clearly emphasized in Guo fa [2017] no.12,to ensure food safety,improve people's well-being,to further improve the national quality and safety of agricultural products traceability management information platform,and provide technical support for food quality and safety management.It is very urgent and necessary to study and solve the problems related to food supply chain.Based on the supply chain based on the theory of incentive theory and evolutionary game theory in food supply chain as the main line,"to encourage the traceability information transmission effectively,the supply chain process to monitor the quality of information link up" as the key,starting from the motivation of different interest subjects,by studying the traceability information transmission of the driving factors of study on incentive mechanism.On the basis of analyzing the framework of incentive theory,we study the incentive factors,the incentive strength and the incentive content.First of all,with the help of evolutionary game model,constructs the food traceability information between supply chain enterprise group evolutionary game model of space and time,pushing the replication dynamic equations of the node enterprises,and the system evolution path,the evolutionary stable strategy of mechanism is analyzed,determine the incentives and penalties.Secondly establish the government,food companies and consumers tripartite game model,study the interaction mechanism of the traceability system in the process of the implementation of the three,the results show that the government set up reasonable subsidies on food companies and consumers or fine,can effectively arouse the enthusiasm of food businesses and consumers,at the same time,enterprises,consumers and the government behavior and influence each other and promote each other.Based on the previous analysis of relevant stakeholders,we selected three dimensions of “food company”,“consumer” and “retrospective food quality ” from the perspective of behavior theory and supply-demand relationship theory,which are respectively driven by the economic interests of the food enterprise dimension and external Environmental diversity,government incentive policies,corporate social responsibility and reputation-driven consumer demand,consumer awareness,consumer spending;traceability,traceability of information platform construction,government mandatory regulations,a total of 13 latent variables,42 observational variables,constructing the structural equation model of this paper,and conducting a survey of food companies and consumers through the design of scales,and using AMOS 23.0 empirical tests to examine the factors that have a positive impact on traceability information transmission and the factors among them.Related associations.The empirical results show that other assumptions are consistent with the original proposition,except for the external environment differences in the implementation of traceability system decisions for food companies and the fact that consumer demand has a positive effect on consumers' decision to purchase traceable foods.Finally,several suggestions and incentives are proposed from the perspectives of food companies,consumers,and the government respectively: The government's incentives for enterprises and consumers are necessary for the issue of incentives for traceable information transmission,and they must play the leading role in the core business.It is necessary to strengthen collaborative sharing and reduce costs in order to improve the performance of the supply chain.As consumers,they should comply with national policies,change their understanding,and increase food safety awareness.
Keywords/Search Tags:food quality safety, traceable information, evolutionary game analysis, structural equation model, incentive mechanism
PDF Full Text Request
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