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Pricing Decisions In A Dual-channel Supply Chain With Corporate Social Responsibility And Free-riding Behaviors

Posted on:2020-04-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z Q LvFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330575452513Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the 20th century,attention to corporate social responsibility has expanded to the relevant members and consumers in the supply chain,which is not just an internal problem of an organization or company.In order to achieve sustainable development,supply chain members need to undertake corresponding corporate social responsibility while pursuing economic benefits,including attention behaviors for stakeholders such as company shareholders,customers,employers,communities,supply chain members and so on.In the enterprise decision-making process,,corporate social responsibility,free-riding behavior,and channel leaders all have an important impact on supply chain member decisions.On the one hand,this paper studies the pricing model of dual-channel supply chain and develops the theory of behavior decision-making.On the other hand,it provides theoretical reference and guidance for the dual-channel supply chain members,pricing decisions in a dual-channel supply chain with corporate social responsibility and free-riding behaviors.Therefore,this paper constructs a decision-making game model under different channel leader models considering corporate social responsibility and free-riding behaviors from the perspective of supply chain by game theory methods and optimization methods.It analyzes the pricing decisions of supply chain members under the social responsibility situation of manufacturers and retailers,and focuses on the impact of corporate social responsibility behaviors and free-riding behaviors on corporate decision-making and profits(utilities)and manufacturers' dual-channel sales.The main results can be obtained as follows:first of all,if the manufacturer assumes corporate social responsibility as a channel leader,the manufacturer(retailer)should increase(reduce)the wholesale price and the direct selling price(retail price)as the proportion of free riders increases.The number of free riders will decrease with the increase in the proportion of free riders under certain conditions.If the loyalty of retail channel consumers is moderate,the increase in the proportion of free riders will benefit the members of the supply chain at the same time.Increased social responsibility concerns of manufacturers(retailers)can promote manufacturers' dual-channel sales under certain conditions,while the reduction in the proportion of free-riders will promote manufacturers' dual-channel sales.Secondly the retailer is channel leader,if retail channel consumers have higher loyalty,manufacturers(retailers)should increase/decrease wholesale and direct selling prices(retail prices)as manufacturers/retailers become more socially responsible.Manufacturers should increase their social responsibility concerns as supply chain members increase their sales to promote dual channels.As the proportion of free riders increases,retailers and manufacturers should lower the retail price,wholesale price and direct selling price of their products.When retailers assume corporate social responsibility,the increase in the proportion of free riders under certain conditions can promote manufacturers to conduct dual-channel sales.Finally,in the case of a manufacturer's corporate social responsibility,if the consumers'loyalty to the retail channel is high,the supply chain members can make higher price decisions.Under certain conditions,the change in the identity of the channel leader will not affect the retailer's price decision,but will promote manufacturers to adjust the direct selling price and wholesale price decision.Moreover,companies can reduce the dominant position of channel leaders by taking social responsibility and promote mutual benefit.
Keywords/Search Tags:corporate social responsibility, free-riding behavior, dual-channel supply chain management, channel leadership, game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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