| With the rapid development of e-commerce and logistics technology, more and more consumers are choosing to shop online, the combined sales model(Click-and-Mortar) of physical channel and online channel has become a new trend in the enterprise. However, when the physical channel and online channel exist in the market at the same time, due to the price and service competition between the different channels and the consumer pre-sale services free-riding behavior, channel conflict is inevitable. Research on the channel sales model selection and operational strategies for dual channel supply chain companies to mitigate channel conflict, can provide the theoretical support in practice and further improve the level of the dual-channel companies’ supply chain management.Taking dual-channel supply chain as research objects, we focus on researching the channel sales model selection and operational strategies for dual channel supply chain companies from marketing and operation angle. On the one hand, we try to expand the knowledge of dual-channel supply chain management vertically, i.e., from single echelon dual-channel to double echelon dual-channel; On the other hand, we try to expand the knowledge of supply chain management horizontally, i.e., from dual-channel to mixed-channel. The research content is deepening, not only considers the channel pricing and service competition, but also considers the free-riding behavior, delivery lead time and other factors which are affected the dual channel companies’ channel selection and operation strategies. The main work and innovations are as follows:(1) Taking single echelon dual-channel retailer as research object, we investigate how the retailer’s two channels make their optimal pricing/service strategies to get their largest profits under free riding market in two different scenarios: the decentralized dual-channel and channel integration. Our analysis shows that when the two channels are operated separately, free riding behavior weakens the physical channel’s pre-sales service motivation, and has a negative effect on the physical channel’s profit and the total profit of the two channels, even on the free-riding channel’s profit under certain conditions. When the two channels are run jointly, under certain market conditions, the retailer may adopt “experience store+online channel sales†model, which means the physical channel is used to provide product experience for customers, and product sales will be done through the online channel.(2) Taking double echelon dual-channel suppley chain as research object, we investigate the dual-channel manufacturer’s optimal pre-sales service cost-sharing(SCS) contract strategy when the dual channels use the differential and non-differential pricing scenarios under free riding. The results show that, despite the existence of free riding behavior, when the manufacturer sells from dual-channel, the pre-sales service cost-sharing contract can effectively stimulate the retailer to improve the pre-sales service level, and can beneficial to the manufacturer’s profit. A “counter-pro?t cost-sharing†phenomenon is found for the retailer. That is, the smaller fraction of service cost the retailer is requested to share, the less profits the retailer will gain under the SCS contract. The manufacturer would sell only through the online channel and the retailer would like to become an “experience center†of the manufacturer if the potential market demand is relatively small. The numerical study shows that the non-differential pricing scenario is beneficial to the retailer but harmful to the manufacturer.(3) Considering a distribution system with a manufacturer and a value-adding retailer who both sell products by the dual-channel. We investigate the two players’ optimal operate strategies under two different price strategies(have/no guiding price for online channel) and two different game structures, i.e., Manufacturer-Stackelberg and Retailer-Stackelberg. Our analysis shows that when the manufacturer gives the guiding price for online channel, the retailer would always set a higher physical channel price than the online channel guiding price in Retailer-Stackelberg scenario. Otherwise, whether the retailer’s physical channel makes sales at higher price than the two online channels or not depends on the model’s parameters, especially the migration effectiveness and the potential market demand. The migration effectiveness always negative to the retailer’s profit, but not always negative to the manufacturer’s profit, and a mild competition between the channels may benefit for the manufacturer and bring him more profit. Under different market conditions, the two players would prefer different pricing strategies to get more profit. When the migration effectiveness is relatively-large, the two players most like to work as a follower and set their strategies when they see the opponent’s strategies. Otherwise, they most like to work as a leader, and try to get more profit by the first move and a lower price.(4) Based on the perspective of consumer utility, different from previous studies, we built the consumer utility model, not only considers the prices of physical and online channels which impact the consumers’ utility, but also considers the pre-sales service level and delivery lead time which also the important factors that impact the consumers’ utility. We investigate the two players’ optimal operate strategies under the centralized and decentralized scenarios. The results show that, under the centralized supply chain scenario, the manufacturer will adopt the dual channel structure when the customer acceptance of the online channel is relatively large. However, under the decentralized supply chain setting, the manufacturer adopts the dual channel strategy only when the traditional channel service cost factor, operate cost and the customer acceptance of the online channel are all high. Moreover, when the manufacturer adopts the dual channel structure under the decentralized condition, the online channel is used for strategic channel control purposes to pull down the retailer channel price but not for sales.The above research results not only enrich the theory of dual-channel supply chain management, but also provide more scientific evidence for the decision maker of the dual-channel companies.
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